a Marius Scheepers 1 éve
144
Még több ilyen
JS316/18
NEHAWU obo Coetzee and Others v Kakamas Water Users Association (JS316/18) [2021] ZALCJHB 447 (8 December 2021)
[127] Section 186(2)(b) of the LRA defines an unfair labour practice as any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and employee involving inter alia the unfair suspension of an employee. In my view, an employer would invite an unfair labour practice dispute relating to suspension if an employee is suspended pending a disciplinary hearing if there is no justification to suspend such employee.
JR2507/15
American Products Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR2507/15) [2020] ZALCJHB 113 (15 July 2020)
Referencing the decision of this Court in Koka v Director-General: Provincial Administration North West Government,[[1997] 7 BLLR 874 (LC)] the Second Respondent distinguished between two types of suspension. The first type of suspension, so the Second Respondent reasoned, was a "holding operation" where the suspension is not designed to impose discipline but is rather for reasons of good administration. The second type of suspension serves as a form of disciplinary action.The Second Respondent held that "the first form of suspension applies to the Applicant because the Respondent suspended him pending an investigation into the circumstances of the accident involving the Respondent's truck in which the Applicant was driving".[]Further to this, the Second Respondent noted that precedent exists in Sappi Forests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others[[2009] 3 BLLR 254 (LC)] that "it is normally unlawful and unfair to suspend an employee without pay pending a disciplinary enquiry".[6] It was common cause that the Third Respondent had been suspended without pay, and that he had not agreed to this form of suspension. For this reason, the suspension was found to be substantively unfair.
As noted by Grogan in Workplace Law, while the wording of section 145 of the LRA appears to refer to suspensions only when imposed as a disciplinary sanction, it is now settled that both precautionary and punitive suspensions fall within the terms of section 186(2)(b) of the LRA.[18] The dicta of Murphy AJA in Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell[(2012) 33 ILJ 2033 (LAC) at para 44.] is an appropriate starting point, where the learned judge stated that:"Ultimately, procedural fairness depends in each case upon the weighing and balancing of a range of factors including the nature of the decision, the rights, interests and expectations affected by it, the circumstances in which it is made, and the consequences resulting from it. When dealing with a holding operation suspension, as opposed to a suspension as a disciplinary sanction, the right to a hearing, or more accurately the standard of procedural fairness, may legitimately be attenuated, for three principal reasons. Firstly, as in the present case, precautionary suspensions tend to be on full pay with the consequence that the prejudice flowing from the action is significantly contained and minimized. Secondly, the period of suspension often will be (or at least should be) for a limited duration ... And, thirdly, the purpose of the suspension - the protection of the integrity of the investigation into the alleged misconduct - risks being undermined by a requirement of an in-depth preliminary investigation".
Further to this, the principles for a fair 'preventive' suspension were outlined in Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province[(2009) 30 ILJ 605 (LC) at para 39.] as follows:"[T]he application of the contractual principle of fair dealing between employer and employee . . . requires first that the employer has a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie at least, that the employee has engaged in serious misconduct; secondly, that there is some objectively justifiable reason to deny the employee access to the workplace based on the integrity of any pending investigation into the alleged misconduct or some other relevant factor that would place the investigation or the interests of affected parties in jeopardy; and thirdly, that the employee is given the opportunity to state a case before the employer makes any final decision to suspend the employee".
This notion was embellished by the Court in Harley v Bacarac Trading 39 (Pty) Ltd[(2009) 30 ILJ 2085 (LC) at para 31.] where the unlawfulness of a "holding operation" suspension was linked to a breach of material terms of a contract of employment:"Suspension without pay and the fairness thereof, are self-evidently linked to the payment of remuneration, especially where, as is the case here, an employee is suspended without pay. Where suspension is effected as a measure pending a disciplinary hearing, as is the case here, suspension without pay is a material breach of contract. In the absence of any apparent apprehension that the applicant's continued B presence in the workplace prejudiced a legitimate business interest and in view of the demonstrated psychological and financial prejudice to the applicant, the applicant's suspension was also unfair".
As held by the Constitutional Court in Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd,[(2019) 40 ILJ 965 (CC) at para 24.] it is settled that "where the suspension is precautionary and not punitive, there is no requirement to afford the employee an opportunity to make representations".[26] With this said, I am not of the opinion that this creates a blanket exemption from affording employees with an opportunity to make representations. The Court in Long however went on to assess that based on the facts before it:"The finding that the suspension was for a fair reason, namely for an investigation to take place, cannot be faulted. Generally, where the suspension is on full pay, cognisable prejudice will be ameliorated. The Labour Courts finding that the suspension was precautionary and did not materially prejudice the applicant, even if there was no opportunity for pre-suspension representations, is sound".[27]
The facts before this Court are distinguishable. The prejudice caused to the Third Respondent by Applicant have rather been exacerbated by the Applicant's decision to suspend him without pay. There is nothing to motivate the failure to provide the Third Respondent with an opportunity to make representations regarding his suspension. I am of the firm view that given the punitive nature of the suspension, a hearing ought to have been conducted prior to the action being taken. This would not have been the case were the suspension to have been with pay.
J1485/2019
Gallocher v Social Housing Regulatory Authority and Another (J1485/2019) [2019] ZALCJHB 162; (2019) 40 ILJ 2723 (LC) (3 July 2019)
Manamela Ida v Department of Co-Operative Governance, Human settlements and Traditional Affairs Limpopo Province and Another (J1886/2013) [2013] ZALCJHB 225 (5 September 2013) at para 20. See also Matola (supra) at para 28; Biyase v Sisonke District Municipality and Another (2012) 33 ILJ 598 (LC) at para 20; Lebu v Maquassi Hills Local Municipality and Others (2) (2012) 33 ILJ 653 (LC) at para 17.
A suspension would be unlawful in instances where the right or power of an employer to effect a suspension is prescribed by specific regulation and these regulations are not complied with by the employer. The unlawfulness is founded in the employer not complying with its own rules. the issue of the lawfulness of the suspension must be based solely on the provisions of the regulatory provisions themselves, as defined therein, and thus only concern the interpretation and application of the actual regulatory provisions in order to assess and determine compliance by the employer.
Mbatha v Ehlanzeni District Municipality and Others (2008) 29 ILJ 1029 (LC)
My considered opinion is that the power to discipline the municipal manager must reside exclusively in the council. I conclude therefore that this power to discipline a municipal manager is vested in the council alone and is not capable of being delegated to an executive mayor. The purported delegation of disciplinary powers of the council was consequently unlawful for want of legality.
[2018] ZACC 7 at paras 23 -25.
Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd and Others
In respect of the merits, the Labour Courts finding that an employer is not required to give an employee an opportunity to make representations prior to a precautionary suspension, cannot be faulted. As the Labour Court correctly stated, the suspension imposed on the applicant was a precautionary measure, not a disciplinary one. This is supported by Mogale, Mashego and Gradwell. Consequently, the requirements relating to fair disciplinary action under the LRA cannot find application. Where the suspension is precautionary and not punitive, there is no requirement to afford the employee an opportunity to make representations.In determining whether the precautionary suspension was permissible, the Labour Court reasoned that the fairness of the suspension is determined by assessing first, whether there is a fair reason for suspension and secondly, whether it prejudices the employee. The finding that the suspension was for a fair reason, namely for an investigation to take place, cannot be faulted. Generally where the suspension is on full pay, cognisable prejudice will be ameliorated. The Labour Courts finding that the suspension was precautionary and did not materially prejudice the applicant, even if there was no opportunity for pre-suspension representations, is sound. (Footnotes omitted)
J4584/2018
Chanda v Ratlou Local Municipality (J4584/2018) [2018] ZALCJHB 428 (28 December 2018)
Heyneke v Umhlatuze Municipality (2010) 31 ILJ 2608 (LC) at para [33] [34]
Special leave that is imposed on employees is effectively a suspension in the hope of subverting the residual unfair labour practice provisions of the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (LRA) and all the time and other constraints that accompany suspensions.To discharge its onus of proving the... lawfulness of the special leave the municipality has to show that the special leave was at all times at the instance of the employee and with his consent, that it was not imposed on him, that exceptional circumstances existed and that the special leave resolution was adopted in good faith, and that it was rational, reasonable, proportionate and in the public interest.
6.14 In this case, given the haste and manner with which the forced special leave was imposed on the Applicant, it is apparent that the Respondent sought to subvert the provisions of Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, and I am satisfied that the Applicant has established a clear right to the relief that he seeks, as no attempt was made to comply with the provisions of the Regulations in suspending him, and furthermore, there is no source document or authority relied upon by the Respondent in imposing the forced special leave.
J2903/16
Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Service Soc Limited v DEMAWUSA and Others (J2903/16) [2017] ZALCJHB 1 (6 January 2017)
A trade unions authority to act on behalf of employees is limited to the powers granted to it inSection 200of theLabourRelations Act 66 of 1995. Absent proof of trade union membership, the trade union lacks the authority to act.
Hlehlethe v CEPWAWU (J2455/16) [2017] ZALCJHB 215 (5 June 2017)
Accordingly the applicant cannot rely on unfair conduct relating to the right to be heard prior to suspension, or other unfair conduct, in these proceedings. If the applicant wants to rely on the principle of unfairness and allege that he has been unfairly treated he can only do so in terms of the unfair labour practise jurisdiction and raise this issue in terms of unfair labour practise dispute resolution processes in the CCMA.
Koka v Director General Provincial Administration North West Government(1997) 18 ILJ 1718 (LC)
Lewis v Heffer and Others 1978 (3) All ER 354 (CA) at 364 C to E
Very often irregularities are disclosed in a government department or in a business house and a man may be suspended on full pay pending enquiries. Suspension may rest on him and he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No one as far as I know has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself and so forth.The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good administration. A situation has arise in which something must be done at once. The work of the department or office is being affected by rumours and suspicions. The others will not trust the man. In order to get back to proper work the man is suspended. At that stage the rules of natural justice do not apply.
Madamela Ida v The Department of Corporate Governments 2014 ZALCJHB 225 dated 5 September 2013 at paragraph 17
At level of general principle precautionary suspension is a unilateral act by the employer which need not be preceded by the application of the principles of audi alteram partem.It is only where specific rules which is often the case in the public centre, in the public sector, prescribe the application of audi alteram partem prior to suspension that it must be applied. It is then applied not because of a general principle of the right to be heard but because the particular rule in fact stipulates it as an essential requirement. In that case the compliance is so because the employer has made its own rules and must comply with them.
Nyati v Special Investigating Unit (2011) 32 ILJ 2991 (LC), Biyase v Sisonke District Municipality and Another (2012) 33 ILJ 598 (LC), Lebo v Makwassi Hills Municipality and Another (2) (2012) 33 ILJ 653 (LC) and SAMWU on behalf of Dlamini and 2 Others v Mogale City Local Municipality and Another [2014] 12 BLLR 1236 (LC).
JS 929/14
Nwaogu v Bridgestone SA and Another (JS 929/14) [2016] ZALCJHB 104 (18 March 2016)
Dince and Others v MEC, Education North West (2010 21 ILJ 1193 (LC).
[23] The important principle enunciated in theMhlauliandMullercases is that the audi alteram partem rule applies in cases of suspension. It is also important to note that the court in theMhlaulicase held that the correct approach to adopt in cases of suspension was that enunciated in theMullercase and that those cases which held that the audi alteram rule does not apply were wrongly decided. I align myself with that approach and wish to emphasize that the prejudice that anemployee may suffer in a case of suspension is not limited to financial prejudice in the case where the suspension is without pay. Suspension with pay also has substantial prejudicial consequences relating to both social and personal standing of the suspended employee. In my view any suspension with or without pay has to bring into question theintegrity and dignity of the suspended person particularly where the suspension is based on allegations of dishonesty. And quite often suspensions attract media attention and thus the standing of the person before his or her colleagues and the community is bound to be negatively affected. It is for this reason in particular that in law theemployer is obliged to afford an employee the opportunity to be heard before the suspension. The process does not entail affording an employee an opportunity to show that he or she is not guilty of the allegations made against him or her. Affording an employee a hearing is such a simple and informal process that employers who subscribe to best labour relations practice would never have difficulty with it, because what it seeks to achieve is not only to protect the interests of the employer but also those of the employee. The interestof the employee is protected by not only giving him or her an opportunity to show why he or she should not be suspended but also protecting their dignity. It has to be remembered that at the time of suspension the person is presumed innocent. His or her guilt can only be determined at the disciplinary or pre-dismissal arbitration proceedings.
Harley v Bacarac Trading 39 (Pty) Ltd [2009] 6 BLLR 534 (LC) at page 536.
MALUTI-A-PHOFUNG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Spijkers v Gebroerders Benedik Abattoir v Alfred Benedik en Zonen
The decisive criterion for establishing whether there is a transfer for the purposes for the directive is whether the business in question retains its identity. Consequently a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of business does not occur merely because its assets are disposed of. Instead it is necessary to consider whether the business was disposed of as a going concern, as would be indicated, inter alia by the fact that its operation was actually continued or resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar activities. In order to determine whether those conditions are met, it is necessary to consider all the facts characterising the transaction in question, including the type of undertaking or business, whether or not the businesss tangible assets, such as buildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are transferred and the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer and the period, if any, for which those activities were suspended. It should be noted, however, that all those circumstances are merely single factors in the overall assessment which must be made and cannot therefore be considered in isolation.
firstly, that the employer had a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie at least, that the employee had engaged in serious misconduct; secondly that there was some objectively justifiable reason to deny the employee access to the workplace based on the integrity of the pending investigation; and thirdly that the employee was provided with an opportunity to state his case before the employer made any final decision to suspend the employee.
Matter urgent; employees not having been heard; union not consulted
damage in reputation not ground for urgency
failure by an employer to comply with the provisions of a disciplinary code
Other case law cited
Highveld District Council v CCMA and Other (2002) 12 BLLR 1158 (LAC)
J1092/08
Lekabe v The Minister Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
no reason why the employer should not uplift the employees suspension
there are no valid reasons to do so; Suspensions have a detrimental impact on the affected employee and may prejudice his or her reputation, advancement, job security and fulfillment; Suspensions should be based on substantive reasons and fair procedures should be followed
No resolution
Invalid
Mogothle v Premier, North West Province (2009) JOL 23089 (LC) at [31].
suspension is the employment equivalent of arrest, with the consequence that an employee suffers palpable prejudice to reputation, advancement and fulfillment. On this basis, he suggests that employees should be suspended pending a disciplinary enquiry only in exceptional circumstances. The only reasonable rationale for suspension in these circumstances, Cheadle suggests, is the reasonable apprehension that the employee will interfere with any investigation that has been initiated, or repeat the misconduct in question.
Jackson v Road Traffic Management Corporation & Others
absence of a contractual right, the legal basis of the employees claim must rest on a right to fair administrative action, or the requirement of legality
regulation 16(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
(1) the employer had to be satisfied that the employee was alleged to have committed a serious offence; (2) the employer had to establish that the continued presence of the employee at the workplace might jeopardize any investigation into the alleged misconduct, or endanger the well-being or safety of any person or property; (3) the employee had to be given an opportunity to make representations before a final decision to suspend him was taken.
not follow own policies
special cost order
J 1520/2019
Maroleng v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Limited (J 1520/2019) [2022] ZALCJHB 319 (18 November 2022)
[4] These proceedings are brought in terms of section 77 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which extends jurisdiction to this court to hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of employment. In essence, the applicant contends that clause 5.1 of the respondents disciplinary code procedure was expressly incorporated in his contract of employment as a contractual term, and that the clause entitles him to an appeal against the decision to dismiss it.
[6]...Vakalisa v South African Weather Services and others [2017] 7 BLLR 729 (LC),...The court held that a proper reading of the rules thus did not disclose any agreement to be bound by reciprocal obligations arising from each and every policy issued by the employer. In those circumstances, there was no incorporation of the disciplinary policy by reference, and a claim for specific performance was thus not sustainable.
[10] But that is not the end of the enquiry. Even if I accept that clause 5.1 of the disciplinary code is a term of the applicants contract of employment, and one capable of surviving the termination of the applicants employment, specific performance remains a discretionary remedy. Relevant factors or grounds to be taken into account include a situation where damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff, where the order would create injustice or would be inequitable or where performance of the obligation is impossible or would produce undue hardship to the defendant (see Haynes v King Williamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A)). Ultimately, each case must be judged in the light of its own circumstances (see National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (T)).
[12] In summary, although the applicants right to an appeal hearing was the subject of a contractual term it is not a term that ought properly, having regard to all of the circumstances, to be the subject of an order for specific performance.
JA29/2021
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and Others v AFGRI Animal Feeds (PTY) Ltd (JA29/2021) [2022] ZALAC 99; (2022) 43 ILJ 1998 (LAC); [2022] 10 BLLR 902 (LAC) (17 June 2022)
[24] Given their legal representation, the employees were not represented in the proceedings by an office-bearer or official of that partys registered trade union in terms of section 161(1)(c). Rather, NUMSAs representation of the employees took the form contemplated in section 200(1)(b) and (c) and section 200(2), in that the union acted as a party to the proceedings on behalf of or in the interest of the employees. Where a union chooses to represent employees on this basis, this Court has recognised that it acts collectively with its members, asserting its members rights and not its own.[MacDonalds Transport Upington (Pty) Ltd v AMCU and others (MacDonalds Transport) [2016] ZALAC 32; (2016) 37 (ILJ) 2593 (LAC); [2017] 2 BLLR 105 (LAC) at para 36.]
[26] The LRA distinguishes between individual employee rights and collective bargaining rights. In MacDonalds Transport,[at para 35] in the context of arbitration proceedings, it was stated:Certainly, when a union demands organisational rights which accord to it a particular status as a collective bargaining agent vis vis an employer, it asserts and must establish [that] it has a right to speak for workers by proving they are its members; sections 11 - 22 of the LRA regulate that right. But in dismissal proceedings (which, plainly, are not about collective bargaining) before the CCMA or a Bargaining Council forum, the union is not (usually) the party, but rather the worker is the party. It is the workers right to choose a representative, subject to restrictions on being represented by a legal practitioner, itself subject to a proper exercise of a discretion to allow such representation. When an individual applicant wants a particular union to represent him in a dismissal proceeding, the only relevant question is that workers right to choose that union.[13]
[32] In GIWUSA v Maseko and others,[21] the Labour Court affirmed the approach to interpreting a constitution of a voluntary organisation as one of benevolence, rather than of nit-picking, which ought to be aimed at the promotion of convenience and the preservation of rights.[22] This is to be contrasted with the approach taken by the Constitutional Court in Lufil:The contractual purpose of a unions constitution and its impact on the right to freedom of association of its current members is founded in its constitution. A voluntary association, such as NUMSA, is bound by its own constitution. It has no powers beyond the four corners of that document. Having elected to define the eligibility for membership in its scope, it manifestly limited its eligibility for membership. When it comes to organisational rights, NUMSA is bound to the categories of membership set out in its scope.[23]
[37] However, when an employee is represented in an individual dispute with their employer by such a union, such representation is aimed at providing effective access to justice and redress to the employee, where it is due, in accordance with both sections 23 and 38 of the Constitution and prevailing labour legislation. Unlike the exercise of organisational rights in an employers workplace, the employer has no interest, in an individual dispute between it and an employee, in holding the union to the terms of the unions constitution in order to limit the employees right to representation. This is so in that the unions scope of operation relates to the industries in which the union is entitled to organise and bargain collectively. That scope does not bar the representation of a union member by that union in an individual dispute with their employer. In the context of labour relations, and given the balance of power which exists between employer and employee in the workplace, to find differently would be manifestly unfair.
JR 1696/17
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa v Malapane and Others (JR 1696/17) [2022] ZALCJHB 90 (7 April 2022)
[33] The Commissioners finding that delay of almost two years from the date of the incident was procedurally unfair cannot be faulted. In Stokwe v Member of the Executive Council: Department of Education, Eastern Cape and Others,[[2018] ZACC 3.] the apex Court observed that:[71] This also accords with the general principles of how delay impacts the fairness of disciplinary proceedings. The question whether a delay in finalisation of disciplinary proceedings is unacceptable is a matter that can be determined on a case-by-case basis. There can be no hard and fast rules. Whether the delay would impact negatively on the fairness of disciplinary proceedings would thus depend on the facts of each case.
[71] This also accords with the general principles of how delay impacts the fairness of disciplinary proceedings. The question whether a delay in finalisation of disciplinary proceedings is unacceptable is a matter that can be determined on a case-by-case basis. There can be no hard and fast rules. Whether the delay would impact negatively on the fairness of disciplinary proceedings would thus depend on the facts of each case.[72] In Moroenyane, the Labour Court considered factors which this Court initially propounded in Sanderson in the context of assessing delays in criminal prosecutions, and applied those factors to determine what constituted an unfair delay in the context of disciplinary proceedings. It held:(a) The delay has to be unreasonable. In this context, firstly, the length of the delay is important. The longer the delay, the more likely it is that it would be unreasonable.(b) The explanation for the delay must be considered. In this respect, the employer must provide an explanation that can reasonably serve to excuse the delay. A delay that is inexcusable would normally lead to a conclusion of unreasonableness.(c) It must also be considered whether the employee has taken steps in the course of the process to assert his or her right to a speedy process. In other words, it would be a factor for consideration if the employee himself or herself stood by and did nothing.(d) Did the delay cause material prejudice to the employee? Establishing the materiality of the prejudice includes an assessment as to what impact the delay has on the ability of the employee to conduct a proper case.(e) The nature of the alleged offence must be taken into account. The offence may be such that there is a particular imperative to have it decided on the merits. This requirement however does not mean that a very serious offence (such as a dishonesty offence) must be dealt with, no matter what, just because it is so serious. What it means is that the nature of the offence could in itself justify a longer period of further investigation, or a longer period in collating and preparing proper evidence, thus causing a delay that is understandable.(f) All the above considerations must be applied, not individually, but holistically.
[36] Grogan J[Workplace Law (7ed) Juta at p183:] pertinently opined as follows in respect of delayed disciplinary proceedings:once the employer has established that an employee is guilty of misconduct, disciplinary proceedings should be instituted within a reasonable time. Excessive delay may estop the employer from dismissing the employee The test, essentially one of fairness is whether the employee has been under the impression that the employer has forgiven them.
[38] In sum, the Commissioner reasonably found that the fairness of the procedure was vitiated by the inordinate delay.
JR1986/20
Ndaa Food Manufacturing CC t/a Ndaa Bakery v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR1986/20) [2022] ZALCJHB 54 (15 March 2022)
[37] True remorse was explained in Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and Others[(2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at para 46.] as follows: Therefore, the crucial question is whether it could be said that Ms Naidu's utterances empirically and objectively translated into real and genuine remorse. In S v Matyityi, the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked as follows on this issue:There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one's error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of those actions.[38] Without the requisite remorse, it is not possible to restore the relationship of trust that forms the foundation of the employment relationship. In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others[(2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at para 25.] the Court said: Acknowledgment of wrong doing is the first step towards rehabilitation. In the absence of a recommitment to the employer's workplace values, an employee cannot hope to re-establish the trust which he himself has broken.
JR2868/17
Mosiapoa v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (JR2868/17) [2021] ZALCJHB 310 (9 September 2021)
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA v Gumbi [2007] 4 ALL SA SCA
[15]...deliberate absence from the disciplinary hearing does not affect the validity of the dismissal.
JR2833/18
Telkom SA SOC Limited v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR2833/18) [2021] ZALCJHB 238 (16 August 2021)
[7] Gross negligence has been the subject of judicial commentary. In Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v MV Stella Tingas[[2003] 1 All SA 286 (SCA) at 290-1] Scott JA defines the concept as follows:... [T]o qualify as gross negligence the conduct in question, although falling short of dolus eventualis, must involve a departure from the standard of the reasonable person to such an extent that it may properly be categorized as extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to be conscious risk-taking, a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no conscious risk-taking, a total failure to take care. If something less were required, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence would lose its validity.
JR 1106/16
Bogoshi v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR 1106/16) [2021] ZALCJHB 186 (2 August 2021)
[84] I will first deal with the ground that the findings were not conveyed to the applicant in 24 hours. Whist this is a breach of the Procedure, it does not follow that the dismissal of the applicant would be procedurally unfair as a result. Any issue of procedural unfairness must be evaluated by an arbitrator based on what is contained in Item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice.[33] That being so, one must always be guided by the following dictum in Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others[(2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC) at 1651F-H.], which has been consistently applied in this Court: It follows that the conception of procedural fairness incorporated into the LRA is one that requires an investigation into any alleged misconduct by the employer, an opportunity by any employee against whom any allegation of misconduct is made, to respond after a reasonable period with the assistance of a representative, a decision by the employer, and notice of that decision. [85] It must follow that any provisions in an employers disciplinary code and procedure containing detailed procedural prescripts in conducting a disciplinary process does not always result in a finding of procedural unfairness simply because those procedures have been contravened. I am not saying that the employer should simply ignore those provisions. It is of course true that where an employer defines its own process and sets its own procedural requirements, it should be expected to adhere to the same.[Motor Industry Staff Association and Another v Silverton Spraypainters and Panelbeaters (Pty) Ltd and Others (2013) 34 ILJ 1440 (LAC at para 44; Riekert v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1706 (LC) at para 22.] An employer that does not comply with its own disciplinary code and procedure would thus always run the risk that such failure could be found to be procedurally unfair.[Black Mountain v CCMA and Others [2005] 1 BLLR 1 (LC) at para 13, the Court held: Where the employer's disciplinary code and policy provide for a particular approach it will generally be considered unfair to follow a different approach without legitimate justification. Justice requires that employers should be held to the standards they have adopted .] However, this obligation on an employer must always be tempered by considerations of workplace efficiency,[Schwartz v Sasol Polymers and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 915 (LAC) at para 13 it was said: workplace efficiencies should not be unduly impeded by onerous procedural requirements .] and / or no prejudice being suffered by the employee due to such failure. In Rand Water Board v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others[(2005) 26 ILJ 2028 (LC) at para 9.], the court dealt with the failure by a chairperson of an appeal hearing to give reasons for her decision, which was prescribed by the disciplinary code of the employer, and held as follows: It would, in my view, be highly technical and wrong to regard such technical procedural defect on the part of the second respondent as constituting procedural unfairness justifying the compensation awarded or at all, particularly in the absence of evidence of any loss or prejudice suffered as a result thereof [86] Therefore, it may well be that even in the case of non-compliance by an employer with its own disciplinary code, that will not be procedurally unfair, based upon considerations of workplace efficiency and prejudice. This would of course be a fact specific enquiry, to be determined in each and every individual case. As held in South African Clothing and Textile workers Union and Others v Filtafelt (Pty) Ltd[(JS263/15) [2017] ZALCJHB 483 (14 November 2017) at para 114. Also compare Silverton Spraypainters (supra) at para 45.]:The point I wish to make is that procedural fairness is a holistic consideration, taking into account the provisions of the Code of Good Practice and the employers internal code and procedure. In this regard, the background events in the course of the entire disciplinary process must be considered.
JR 2095/16
Pilusa v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR 2095/16) [2021] ZALCJHB 189 (29 July 2021)
[18] The real question to be answered in this regard is whether the applicant had been afforded a right to be heard? In JDG Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Price 'n Pride v Brunsdon,[(2000) 21 ILJ 501 (LAC) at paras 60-62.] the LAC rejected the contention rule of natural justice may be dispense with in a case of a senior employee who knew what his shortcomings were; and stated that:The opportunity which is given to a senior employee must still meet at least the two basic requirements of the audi alteram partem rule, namely, he must be given notice of the contemplated action and a proper opportunity to be heard. The reference to notice of the contemplated action necessarily implies that the action has not been decided upon finally as yet but that it is one which may or may not be taken depending on the representations which the affected person may give[] (Emphasis added)
[19] In my view, it cannot be said in the present instance that that applicant was really afforded a proper opportunity to be heard. It is hard to comprehend how was he expected to question the case of the third respondent if he was not given the details thereof prior to the disciplinary enquiry. To make matters worse, the applicant was also served with the charge sheet during the mine shutdown. It follows that the procedure that led to the applicants dismissal was not fair.
[22] In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that compensation that is equivalent to two months remuneration is just and equitable. The applicant was earning R22 90.00 per month at the time of his dismissal. As such, the total quantum is R45 800.00.
JR 2827/18
Madikizela v City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Another (JR 2827/18) [2021] ZALCJHB 205 (26 July 2021)
[105] First, and on the legal principles, the second respondent correctly summarized, in his award, what these are. I will suffice by saying that the Code of Good Practice in the LRA provides for consistency as a consideration in deciding the issue of the fairness of the sanction of dismissal.[Schedule 8 Item 3(6) which reads: The employer should apply the penalty of dismissal consistently with the way in which it has been applied to the same and other employees in the past, and consistently as between two or more employees who participate in the misconduct under consideration.] Where instances of inconsistency are raised as a defence to dismissal as an appropriate sanction, this would form part of the value judgment that must be exercised in deciding whether dismissal is fair.[Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at paras 36 37; Consani Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2004) 25 ILJ 1707 (LC) at para 19.] The well-known judgment of SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin and Johnson Ltd,[(1999) 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC) at para 29.] aptly determined the principles applicable to deciding inconsistency, as being: (1) Employees must be measured against the same standards (like for like comparison); (2) Did the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry conscientiously and honestly determine the misconduct; (3) The decision by the employer not to dismiss other employees involved in the same misconduct must not be capricious, or induced by improper motives or by a discriminating management policy (in other words this conduct must be bona fide); and (4) A value judgment must always be exercised[SRV Mill Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2004) 25 ILJ 135 (LC) at para 23.]. In general, inconsistency as a consideration is intended to protect employees against arbitrary conduct by the employer. Objective difference in circumstances is thus an important consideration.[Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 452 (LC) at para 10] As described by the Court in Bidserv Industrial Products (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others[74]: A generalised allegation of inconsistency is not sufficient. A concrete allegation identifying who the persons are who were treated differently and the basis upon which they ought not to have been treated differently or that no distinction should have been made must be set out clearly.
J 748/21
Rand West City Local Municipality v Goba (J 748/21) [2021] ZALCJHB 157 (20 July 2021)
[50] No convincing reason has been put forward as to why the devices could not be handed over. In fact, it is evident from the opposing affidavit that the Respondent has not proffered a single reason or basis for his refusal to handover his laptop. The cellular phone and iPad had been subsidized by the Applicant as tools of trade for purposes of the execution of his official duties. The devices were not issued to the Respondent or subsidized for his personal use or other recreational purposes they were tools of trade. The Applicant is entitled to have access to the information on the devices, as it relates to the execution of his official duties.
JA20/2020
Sasol Mine Limited v Nhlapo and Others (JA20/2020) [2021] ZALAC 28 (9 September 2021)
[40] The obligation upon an employer to act consistently in the application of discipline arises in two contexts in our law. The first is in relation to the application of the rule and the second is in relation to the imposition of sanction.[16] In both respects there can exist either contemporaneous inconsistency or historical consistency.
Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2010) 31 ILJ 452 (LC) at para 10.
The courts have distinguished two forms of inconsistency - historical and contemporaneous inconsistency. The former requires that the employer apply the penalty of dismissal consistently with the way in which the penalty has been applied to other employees in the past; the latter requires that the penalty be applied consistently as between two or more employees who commit the same misconduct.
PA12/19
Sol Plaatje Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (PA12/19) [2021] ZALAC 24; [2021] 11 BLLR 1096 (LAC) (5 August 2021)
[30] It has also been repeatedly held by this Court that there is a major difference between the wording of charges in criminal matters and that of charges in disciplinary proceedings, and that an unduly technical approach to the framing and consideration of the latter should be avoided.[Pailprint (Pty) Ltd v Lyster NO and others (2019 40 ILJ 2047 (LAC) para 18; First National Bank Ltd v Language (2013) 34 ILJ 3103 (LAC).] There is also authority in this Court that if the main charge of misconduct is not proved, but an attempt to commit such misconduct is proved, the employee may be found guilty of such an attempt on that same charge.
JA122/2019
Anglo American Platinum Ltd v Beyers and Others (JA122/2019) [2021] ZALAC 16; [2021] 10 BLLR 965 (LAC); (2021) 42 ILJ 2149 (LAC) (2 July 2021)
[16] The primary grounds of appeal of the appellant relate to the following three main findings of the court a quo:16.1 It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove exceptional circumstances that justified its decision to review and change Mr Beyers sanction, and no such exceptional circumstances existed.
J 533/2021
Marhule v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (J 533/2021) [2021] ZALCJHB 63 (30 May 2021)
[9] The reluctance on the part of the Court to willy-nilly intervene in internal disciplinary processes or to micro-manage these processes is based on the trite principle that the prerogative to discipline remains that of the employer, and any such undue interference invariably intrudes into the employers powers and rights to take disciplinary action. Furthermore, any such intrusions and interventions do not at all serve the principle of expeditious resolution of disputes and finalisation of internal processes at the workplace.
[5] See Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security and Others [2011] 1 BLLR 83 (LAC) at para 36, where it was held;To answer the question that was before the court a quo, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to interdict any unfair conduct including disciplinary action. However, such an intervention should be exercised in exceptional cases. It is not appropriate to set out the test. It should be left to the discretion of the Labour Court to exercise such powers having regard to the facts of each case. Among the factors to be considered would in my view be whether failure to intervene would lead to grave injustice or whether justice might be attained by other means. The list is not exhaustive.See also Zondo and Another v Uthukela District Municipality and Another (2015) 36 ILJ 502 (LC); Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) at para 17, where it was held:'Although the court has jurisdiction to entertain an application to intervene in uncompleted disciplinary proceedings, it ought not to do so unless the circumstances are truly exceptional. Urgent applications to review and set aside preliminary rulings made during the course of a disciplinary enquiry or to challenge the validity of the institution of the proceedings ought to be discouraged. These are matters best dealt with in arbitration proceedings consequent on any allegation of unfair dismissal, and if necessary, by this court in review proceedings
J 528/21
Mogaladi and Another v Public Protector South Africa (J 528/21) [2021] ZALCJHB 64 (28 May 2021)
[12] See also Samson v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (D460/08) [2009] ZALC 64; (2010) 31 ILJ 170 (LC); [2009] 11 BLLR 1119 (LC) at para 12
22.1 On a general level, it is correct that an employer has a right to subject an employee to a second disciplinary inquiry on the same issue in respect of which he has already been found guilty and has had a sanction imposed upon him when it is, in all the circumstances, fair to do so[12].
Branford v Metrorail Services (Durban) and Others (DA19/2002) [2003] ZALAC 16 (13 November 2003) At para 15
22.2 Exceptional circumstances is not however the only yardstick, as fairness dictates that the interests of the employee and the employer must be brought into account. The employer is entitled to revisit the offence by means of a second disciplinary hearing, as it would be manifestly unfair for the employer to be saddled with a quick, ill-informal and incorrect decision of its employers who misconceived the seriousness of the matter and took an inappropriate decision leading to an inappropriate penalty[13].
MEC for Finance: Kwazulu-Natal and Another v Dorkin NO and Another (DA16/05) [2007] ZALAC 34; [2008] 6 BLLR 540 (LAC) (21 December 2007) At paras 10 and 14
22.3 The conduct of disciplinary hearings in the workplace where the employer is the State constitutes administrative action, which is required to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. However if it can be shown that the conduct or decision was not reasonable, that action can be reviewed and set aside[14].
Ntshangase v MEC for Finance: Kwazulu-Natal & Another 2010(3) SA 201 (SCA); (2009) 30 ILJ 2653 (SCA) at para 14
22.4 The decision of the chairperson of the hearing, acting qua state employer, qualifies as administrative action and that the chairpersons decision could be reviewed on such grounds as are permissible in law which would make the decision reviewable under section 158 (1)(h) of the LRA. In such circumstances, the state as an employer was not only entitled, but bound to take the chairpersons decision on review, and that it could competently do so in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the LRA which makes clear provision for such a review on such grounds as are permissible in law[15].
Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality and Another (CA24/2013) [2014] ZALAC 49; [2014] 12 BLLR 1170 (LAC); (2015) 36 ILJ 163 (LAC)
This is so in that this Court has the power under section 158(1)(h) of the LRA to review the decision taken by a presiding officer of a disciplinary hearing on: i) the grounds listed in PAJA, provided the decision constitutes administrative action; ii) in terms of the common law in relation to domestic or contractual disciplinary proceedings; or iii) in accordance with the requirements of the constitutional principle of legality, such being grounds permissible in law[16].
SARS v CCMA & Others (Chatrooghoon) (DA 7/11) [2013] ZALAC 26; [2014] 1 BLLR 44 (LAC); (2014) 35 ILJ 656 (LAC) At para 28, where it was held;The wording of the collective agreement does not only make it abundantly clear that the chairpersons pronouncement on penalty is the final sanction...it also leaves no room for interpretation in favour of the parties having intended to provide in the collective agreement a term granting a right to SARS to substitute its own sanction for a sanction imposed by its chairperson. Whilst it is trite that the duty of trust and confidence on the part of an employee is a term implied by law in an employment contract, I do not think that such implied term extends to include, the right of an employer to substitute its own sanction for that of the chairperson, particularly...where the parties in a collective agreement elected expressly to confer on the disciplinary chairperson the sole power to impose the final sanction
JR 82/18
Performing Arts Council of Free State v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR 82/18) [2021] ZALCJHB 70 (27 May 2021)
Sidumo supra n 2 at para 78; Bridgestone SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers Union of South Africa and Others [2016] ZALAC 40; (2016) 37 ILJ 2277 (LAC); National Commissioner of the SA Police Service v Myers and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1417 (LAC) at para 82-85.
[26] Given the deductions I have made above, I am satisfied that the third respondent was guilty as charged. When it comes to the sanction, the enquiry on the appropriateness thereof entails a consideration of the totality of circumstances which, inter alia, include the importance of the rule breached, the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, the basis of the employee's challenge to the dismissal, the harm caused by the employee's conduct, whether additional training and instruction may result in the employee not repeating the misconduct, the effect of dismissal on the employee and his or her long-service record.[15]
Autozone v Dispute Resolution Centre of Motor Industry & Others (2019) 40 ILJ 1501 (LAC) at paras 12-13.
While as a CEO, he was the custodian of discipline and yet he failed to lead by example or show any remorse. In my view, it is apparent from the conduct of the third respondent and the circumstances that led to his dismissal that the employment relationship is irreparably damaged and dismissal accordingly warranted.[16]
J119/21
Ndlovu v Chaane N.O and Another (J119/21) [2021] ZALCJHB 20 (1 March 2021)
during the brief adjournment of the proceedings...in assisting a witness to locate the document which a witness was struggling to find
the applicant is seeking a final relief which in effect extinguishes the second respondent's right to proceed with the disciplinary hearing or to discipline her at all.
[23] The exceptional circumstances calling for the Court's intervention must be found in the applicant's pleaded case and not based on arguments of a mere suspicion that she will not receive a fair hearing.
[26] There is abundance of evidence to the effect that the urgency claimed by the applicant is self-created and sadly at the expense of the tax payers.
JA106/2019
Nyathikazi v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (JA106/2019) [2021] ZALAC 11 (26 May 2021)
[25] In this connection, it is regrettable that the approach adopted both by the second respondent and the court a quo stands in contradiction that of this Court as set out in Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and others [2015] BLLR 1 (LAC). Ndlovu JA, after a careful analysis of the existing jurisprudence regarding discriminatory decisions with regard to dismissal stated at para 35:It is trite that the concept of parity, in the juristic sense, denotes a sense of fairness and equality before the law which are fundamental pillars of the administration of justice.The learned judge of appeal then went on to say:It ought to be realised, in my view, that the parity principle may not just be applied willy-nilly without any measure of caution. In this regard I am inclined to agree with Professor Grogan when he remarks as follows:The parity principle should be applied with caution. It may well be that employees who thoroughly deserved to be dismissed profit from the fact that other employees happened not to have been dismissed for a similar offence in the past or because another employee involved in the same misconduct was not dismissed through some oversight by a disciplinary officer, or because disciplinary officers had different views on the appropriate penalty. (at para 36).
JA 36/2019
South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd v Phasha (JA 36/2019) [2020] ZALAC 50 (27 November 2020)
[34] The argument on behalf of the appellant was that if there was a case of wrongful dismissal, it had to be grounded in the concept of fairness. But under the reasoning employed in this judgment, the ultimate finding is that by attempting to circumvent the process in terms of s 188A of the LRA, the appellant acted unlawfully. The distinction between fairness and unlawfulness was emphasised by the Constitutional Court in Steenkamp and others v Edcon Ltd (National Union of Metal Workers of SA intervening) (2016) 37 ILJ 564 (CC) paras 189 and 192 where the court said that:An invalid dismissal is a nullity. In the eyes of the law an employee whose dismissal is invalid has never been dismissed. If, in the eyes of the law, that employee has never been dismissed, that means that the employee remains in his or her position in the employ of the employerIt is an employee whose dismissal is unfair that requires an order of reinstatement. An employee whose dismissal is invalid does not need an order of reinstatement if an employee whose dismissal has been declared invalid is prevented by the employer from entering the workplace to perform his or her duties in an appropriate case a court may interdict the employer from preventing the employee from reporting for duty or from performing his or her duties. The court may also make an order that the employer must allow the employee into the workplace for purpose of performing his or her duties. However it cannot order the reinstatement of the employees. (para 192)
[35] That must be the position in this case given the finding to which this court has arrived; that unlawfulness renders the initial decision void. And that means that the respondent is entitled to be put back into a position from which she was unlawfully removed. This finding, of course, has nothing to say about the merits of the allegations that were to be determined by the s188A process until it was subverted by appellants action to dismiss on an ostensibly separate ground. That dispute will doubtless still await determination.
J 814/20
Mokoena v Merafong City Local Municipality and Another (J 814/20) [2020] ZALCJHB 135 (24 August 2020)
24.5 The applicants conduct however after the final postponement of 14 July 2020 demonstrated her outright resistance to the holding of the enquiry. Flowing from that postponement, she and her representative knew that proceedings would be held via Zoom or MS Teams. No objection was raised at the time, and no effort was made to advise the Municipality of any problems that may be anticipated in holding the hearings on a virtual platform.
24.8.1 In objecting to the convening of the hearings over the Zoom platform, it is clear the applicant had used such a platform before as evident from her legal representatives submissions, who had indeed confirmed such a fact, albeit addressing the challenges posed by Zoom[10].
24.8.6 Worst all, throughout the alleged connectivity problems that she had experienced whilst Ngcobo was at her residence, not once did the applicant make any attempt to call or contact De Swardt or the Chairperson, let alone instruct her representative to do the same, and informed them of the alleged connectivity problems.
JR 2236/17
Laubscher v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) and Others (JR 2236/17) [2020] ZALCJHB 103; [2020] 10 BLLR 1053 (LC) (15 June 2020)
[54] It is trite that discipline must be brought in a prompt fashion. Failure to do so annihilates the disciplinary process and as a necessary consequence thereof that the charges against the employee could fall away in totality. In the unreported judgment of Fritz Letsoni Mohlala v The South African Post Office and Others[16], the Labour Court held that the delay in the disciplinary process was unfair and that justice delayed is justice denied.
JR 78/18
Zistics Transport CC v DUSWO and Others (JR 78/18) [2020] ZALCJHB 220 (7 May 2020)
Semenya v CCMA and others (2006) 27 ILJ 1627 (LAC)
The technical defence that since the disciplinary enquiry was scheduled for 17 March 2017 is not helpful to the applicant in light of the uncontested evidence of the dismissed employees. It is not unusual for an employer to hold a disciplinary hearing after a dismissal of an employee[4]. Thus, it is no answer that since a hearing was still to happen then ex hypothesi there was no dismissal factually.
JR1889/14
South African Airways Technical SOC Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR1889/14) [2020] ZALCJHB 58 (3 March 2020)
Bidserv Industrial Products ( Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2017) 38 ILJ 860 (LAC) at para 31
This Court sounded a warning on approaching the question of inconsistency in the application of discipline willy-nilly without any measure of caution. Inconsistency is a factor to be taken into account in the determination of the fairness of the dismissal but by no means decisive of the outcome on the determination of reasonableness and fairness of the decision to dismiss. A generalised allegation of inconsistency is not sufficient. A concrete allegation identifying who the persons are who were treated differently and the basis upon which they ought not to have been treated differently or that no distinction should have been made must be set out clearly.
[50] It is my view that even if an employee is able to identify the persons who were treated differently and the basis upon which they ought not to have been treated differently, the enquiry does not end at that point, in that there are other factors to be considered, including but not limited to personal circumstances of individual employees, their positions and responsibilities at the workplace, the overall effect of the misconduct in question, the employees posture after the misconduct in question, including at internal disciplinary hearings and arbitration proceedings.
JR2099/16
Anglogold Ashanti Limited v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union obo Dlungane and Others (JR2099/16) [2020] ZALCJHB 46 (20 February 2020)
National Battery (Pty) Ltd v Matshoba and Others,[(2010) 5 BLLR 534 (LC).] the court pointed out that the labels assigned to the misconduct are irrelevant the point is whether the evidence demonstrates a case of wrongdoing.
EOH Abantu (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2019) 40 ILJ 2477 (LAC); [2019] 12 BLLR 1304 (LAC) at paras 14 -16.
[15] One of the key elements of fairness is that an employee must be made aware of the charges against him. It is always best for the charges to be precisely formulated and given to the employee in advance of the hearing in order to afford a fair opportunity for preparation. The charges must be specific enough for the employee to be able to answer them. The employer ordinarily cannot change the charge, or add new charges, after the commencement of the hearing where it would be prejudicial to do so. However, by the same token, courts and arbitrators must not adopt too formalistic or technical an approach. It normally will be sufficient if the employee has adequate notice and information to ascertain what act of misconduct he is alleged to have committed. The categorisation by the employer of the alleged misconduct is of less importance.[16] Employers embarking on disciplinary proceedings, not being skilled legal practitioners, sometimes define or restrict the alleged misconduct too narrowly or incorrectly. For example, it is not uncommon for an employee to be charged with theft and for the evidence at the disciplinary enquiry or arbitration to establish the offence of unauthorised possession or use of company property. The principle in such cases is that provided a workplace standard has been contravened, which the employee knew (or reasonably should have known) could form the basis for discipline, and no significant prejudice flowed from the incorrect characterisation, an appropriate disciplinary sanction may be imposed. It will be enough if the employee is informed that the disciplinary enquiry arose out of the fact that on a certain date, time and place he is alleged to have acted wrongfully or in breach of applicable rules or standards. (Emphasis added)
Fairness is the hallmark of the law of dismissal
JR1743/17
Bidair Services (Pty) Ltd v Sekhabisa N.O and Others (JR174317) [2019] ZALCJHB 328 (26 November 2019)
Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at para 46. Therefore, the crucial question is whether it could be said that Ms Naidu's utterances empirically and objectively translated into real and genuine remorse. In S v Matyityi, the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked as follows on this issue:
There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one's error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of those actions.
[55] Without the requisite remorse, it is not possible to restore the relationship of trust that forms the foundation of the employment relationship. In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at para 25.
As said in De Beers supra[Id at para 22. See also Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v National Union of Mineworkers and Others (2001) 22 ILJ 658 (LAC) at paras 21 22.]:A dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much less is it an act of vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operational response to risk management in the particular enterprise. That is why supermarket shelf packers who steal small items are routinely dismissed. Their dismissal has little to do with society's moral opprobrium of a minor theft; it has everything to do with the operational requirements of the employer's enterprise.'
JR444/2017
Beyers v Anglo American Platinum Ltd Mogalakwena Section and Others (JR444/2017) [2019] ZALCJHB 272; [2020] 2 BLLR 173 (LC); (2020) 41 ILJ 1376 (LC) (11 October 2019)
[18] It is common cause that the Disciplinary Code did not confer Anglo American with powers to review a chairpersons decision. Therefore, the onus was on Anglo American to prove, on balance of probabilities, that it was entitled to review its own sanction.
Samson v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 170 (LC); [2009] 11 BLLR 1119 (LC) at para 11.
[12] the law as it presently stands is that an employer is entitled, when it is fair to do so (subject to the qualification that it is only in exceptional circumstances that it will be fair) to revisit a penalty already imposed and substitute it with a more severe sanction. (Emphasis added)
Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2003) 24 ILJ 355 (LAC) at paras 22 to 23.
[22] In BMW SA (Pty) Ltd v Van der Walt (2001) 21 ILJ 113 (LAC) Conradie JA cautioned against the importation of the principles of autrefois acquit into labour law. He then made two cautionary remarks:It may be that the second disciplinary enquiry is ultra vires the employers disciplinary code (Strydom v Usko Ltd [1997] 3 BLLR 343 (CCMA) at 350FG). That might be a stumbling block. Secondly, it would probably not be considered to be fair to hold more than one disciplinary enquiry save in rather exceptional circumstances (at paragraph 12).[23] In the present case appellant acted without recourse to the express provision of its disciplinary code and on the basis of no precedent. Second respondent decided that the evidence put up by appellant did not justify interference with the Kemp enquiry. In my view, there is no basis for concluding that the decision of second respondent was unjustifiable, in terms of the evidence which was presented at the arbitration hearing.[9]
Rabie v Department of Trade and Industry and Another (LC), unreported case no J515/18 (5 March 20180 at para 27.
[27] Another reason why abandoning the pre-dismissal arbitration is unlawful is that it is impermissible in terms of the doctrine of the right of election which has since been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others.[11] The Constitutional Court referred with approval to Chamber of Mines of South Africa v National Union of Mineworkers and Another[12] where it was stated that:One or other of two parties between whom some legal relationship subsists is sometimes faced with two alternative and entirely inconsistent courses of action or remedies. The principle that in this situation the law will not allow that party to blow hot and cold is a fundamental one of general application. A useful illustration of the principle is offered in the relationship between master and servant when there comes to the knowledge of the former some conduct on the part of the latter justifying the servants dismissal. The position in which the master then finds himself is thus described by Bristowe J in Angehrn and Piel v Federal Cold Storage Co Ltd 1908 TS 761 at 786:It seems to me that as soon as an act or group of acts clearly justifying dismissal comes to the knowledge of the employer it is for him to elect whether he will determine the contract or retain the servant He must be allowed a reasonable time within which to make his election. Still, make it he must, and having once made it he must abide by it. In this, as in all cases of election, he cannot first take one road and then turn back and take another. Quod semel placuit in electionibus amplius displicere non potest (see Coke Litt 146, and Dig 30.1.84.9; 18.3.4.2; 45.1.112). If an unequivocal act has been performed, that is, an act which necessarily supposes an election in a particular direction, that is conclusive proof of the election having taken place.The above statement of the principle may require amplification in the following respect indicated by Spencer Bower Estoppel by Representation (1923) para 244 at 224 - 5:It is not... quite correct to say nakedly that a right of election, when once exercised, is exhausted and irrevocable, or in Coke's phraseology: quod semel in electionibus placuit amplius displicere non potest, as if mere mutability were for its own sake alone banned and penalized by the law as a public offence, irrespective of the question whether any individual has been injured by the volte-face. It is not so. A man may change his mind as often as he pleases, so long as no injustice is thereby done to another. If there is no person who raises any objection, having the right to do so, the law raises none. (Emphasis added)
[36] It follows that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, Anglo Americans volte face was patently unjust to Mr Beyers; hence his objection. The dictates of modest fairness between employer and employee demand that his objection should be sustained.
J1788/19
Mokoena v Merafong Municipality and Others (J1788/19) [2019] ZALCJHB 226; (2020) 41 ILJ 234 (LC) (13 September 2019)
Fidelity Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC) at para 32.
It is an elementary principle of not only our labour law in this country but also of labour law in many other countries that the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal of an employee must be determined on the basis of the reasons for dismissal which the employer gave at the time of the dismissal.
JR2462/18
Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (JR2462/18) [2019] ZALCJHB 240 (12 September 2019)
NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Another 2003 (3) SA 513 (CC).
[34] Of importance to the case in the ILO jurisprudence described is firstly the principle that freedom of association is ordinarily interpreted to afford trade unions the right to recruit members and to represent those members at least in individual workplace grievancesThe first principle is closely related to the principle of freedom of association entrenched in section 18 of our Constitution, which is given specific content in the right to form and join a trade union entrenched in section 23(2)(a), and the right of trade unions to organise in section 23(4)(b). These rights will be impaired where workers are not permitted to have their union represent them in workplace disciplinary and grievance matters, but be required to be represented by a rival union that they have chosen not to join
[36] Taking these two principles togetherwould suggest that a reading of the Act which permitted minority unions the right to strikefor the purposes of the representation of union members in grievances and disciplinary procedures would be more in accordance with the principle of freedom of association entrenched in the ILO Conventions.
JR2537/17
Hestony Transport (Pty) Limited v Venter N.O and Others (JR2537/17) [2019] ZALCJHB 175 (12 July 2019)
[35] There exists no reason why the Chairperson did not obtain the services of an Interpreter and he deviated from the preferred language despite the fact that the right to understand proceedings is a cornerstone of the LRA. The Applicant was in fact deprived of a very basic right.[36] The internal hearing was not conducted in a fair manner and the process was unfair. It therefore follows that the dismissal was procedurally unfair.
J1177/19
Naidoo and Another v Standard Bank SA Ltd and Another (J1177/19) [2019] ZALCJHB 168; [2019] 9 BLLR 934 (LC); (2019) 40 ILJ 2589 (LC) (24 May 2019)
1. The first respondent (Standard Bank of South Africa) has no power to discipline the first and second respondents subsequent to their resignation with immediate effect. 2. Standard Bank is interdicted from continuing with the disciplinary enquires against the applicants that were scheduled to commence on 16 March 2019 and 22 March 2019 respectively.
The effect of resignation
[14] In Sihlali v SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd[1], resignation was held to be a unilateral termination of a contract of employment by the employee. Therefore, resignation brings an end to the contract of employment. In legal parlance, once an employee has resigned, he ceases to be an employee of that employer,
Toyota SA Motors (Pty) v CCMA and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 313 (CC); [2016] 3 BLLR 217 (CC); 2016 (3) BCLR 374 (CC) at para 142.
[15] It is a statutory requirement of our law, for an employee to give and serve an employer a notice period upon resignation. However, both parties may agree to waive the said notice period and the employee is free to leave. This is ideally a desirable event-free situation, however, there are instances where the employer does accept the resignation but however, wishes to hold the employee to its statutory or contractual notice period.[16] In giving effect to the principle in Toyota[3], one has to establish when does the resignation take effect. This will depend on the type of resignation: the first one will of course be resignation on notice, in this instance the resignation will only take effect at the end of the notice period. The second instance would be where an employee resigns with immediate effect, which means that the employee will not serve out his notice period and the resignation will take effect immediately.
[18] In Sihlali[4] the Court held that where an employee resigns without giving the required notice period, that employee breaches the employment contract. In this situation, what would be the recourse available to the employer?
Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Motsa and Another [2016] 5 BLLR 523 (LC); (2016) 37 ILJ 1241 (LC).
When an employee gives the required notice the contract terminates at the end of the notice period. When an employee leaves his or her employment without giving the required period of notice the employee breaches the contract. Ordinary contractual rules dictate that the employer may hold the employee to the contract and seek an order of specific performance requiring the employee to serve the period of notice. Alternatively, the employer may elect to accept the employees repudiation, cancel the contract and claim damages.
[19] At this juncture, it is apposite to deal with the misconception amongst employers that they have a right to refuse to accept a resignation-this is flawed and was frowned upon by the Court in Sihlali[6] where the Court held such conduct to amount to a form of indentured labour: it said:If resignation to be valid only once it is accepted by an employer, the latter would in effect be entitled, by a simple stratagem of refusing to accept a tendered resignation, to require an employee to remain in employment. Against his or her will. This cannot be-it would reduce the employment relationship to a form of indentured labour. [7]
Mtati v KPMG Services (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZALCJHB 403; [2017] 3 BLLR 315 (LC); (2017) 38 ILJ 1362 (LC) at para 25.
[24] In my view, the second letter of resignation of the applicant changed the status of the employee from that of being an employee, in the ordinary sense of the word, to that of being the erstwhile employee of the respondent. This means that the termination of the employment contract with immediate effect took away the right of the first respondent to proceed with the disciplinary hearing against her. The powers of the employer to discipline an employee post the resignation is well illustrated by what is said in the decision of the Labour Appeal Court of Lesotho in the case of Mahamo v Nedbank Lesotho Limited, where it is held that:Resignation is a unilateral act which brings about termination of the employment relationship without requiring acceptance...Whilst the Respondent took every effort to ensure that the disciplinary hearing was procedurally fair, its efforts were unnecessary because the employment contract had already been terminated by the Applicant himself on 20th October 2000. . .
Where an employee resigns from the employ of his employer and does so voluntarily, the employer may not discipline that employee after the resignation has taken effect. That is because, once the resignation has taken effect, the employee is no longer an employee of that employer and that employer does not have jurisdiction over the employee anymore.
JR1163/16
Kock v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR1163/16) [2019] ZALCJHB 41; (2019) 40 ILJ 1625 (LC); [2019] 7 BLLR 703 (LC) (5 March 2019)
[29] Sidumo (supra) at para 78; National Commissioner of the SA Police Service v Myers and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 1417 (LAC) at para 82; Bridgestone SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 2277 (LAC) at paras 17 18; Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 2831 (LAC) at para 14; Msunduzi Municipality v Hoskins (2017) 38 ILJ 582 (LAC) at para 30; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and Others (2013) 34 ILJ 549 (LAC) at para 54; Samancor Chrome Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochrome) v Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 1057 (LAC) at para 34; Mutual Construction Co Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 901 (LAC) at paras 37 38; Fidelity Cash Management (supra) at para 94.
[53] In deciding whether an employer acted fairly in deciding to dismiss an employee, a variety of factors must be considered, as a whole. These are, in sum, the following: (1) the importance of the rule that had been breached (seriousness of the misconduct); (2) the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal; (3) The explanation presented by the employee for the misconduct; (3) the harm caused by the employee's conduct; (4) whether additional training and instruction may result in the employee not repeating the misconduct; (5) the service record of the employee; (6) the breakdown of the trust / employment relationship between the employer and employee; (7) the existence or not of dishonesty; (8) the possibility of progressive discipline; (9) the existence or not of remorse; (10) the job function of the employee; and (11) the employers disciplinary code and procedure.
Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Byrne NO and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 2705 (LC) at para 9.
the determination of the fairness of a dismissal required a commissioner to form a value judgment, one constrained by the fact that fairness requires the commissioner to have regard to the interests of both the employer and the worker and to achieve a balanced and equitable assessment of the fairness of the sanction
Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd v Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers Union and Others (1991) 12 ILJ 1032 (LAC) at 1037F-H. See also Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA and Another v Wooltru Ltd t/a Woolworths (Randburg) (1989) 10 ILJ 311 (IC).
In our view a disregard by an employee of his employer's authority, especially in the presence of other employees, amounts to insubordination and it cannot be expected that an employer should tolerate such conduct. The relationship of trust, mutual confidence and respect which is the very essence of a master servant relationship cannot, under these circumstances, continue. In the absence of facts showing that this relationship was not detrimentally affected by the conduct of the employee it is unreasonable to compel either of the parties to continue with the relationship...
JR545/15
Rinsa (Pty) Ltd t/a Ultra City Middleburg v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others (JR545/15) [2018] ZALCJHB 402 (5 December 2018)
MEC: Department of Health, ECP v PHSDSBC and Others [2016] ZALCPE 9; [2016] 6 BLLR 621 (LC); (2016) 37 ILJ 1429 (LC) at paras 38 to 42.
Court endorsed the concept of plea bargaining in the labour law context and held that it does not constitute inconsistent application of discipline. However, the Court was emphatic that the exercise of that discretion should not be informed by mala fides and hinted that the decision to offer a plea deal were not fairly exercised would include:[4](a) that the evidence the witness gave was not reasonably necessary to secure a guilty finding against the accused employees, including because such evidence was readily available from other sources;(b) an imbalance in the relative degree of culpability of the witness and the accused employees, such that the proverbial 'big fish' was used to secure a guilty finding against the 'little fish';(c) that the decision to conclude a plea agreement was induced by an improper motive such as obvious favouritism or capriciousness; and/or(d) unfair racial, gender or other discrimination in favour of the accomplice witness or against the remaining accused employees.
[9] In the present case, there is a glaring imbalance in the comparative degree of blameworthiness of Ms Mnguni, a 'big fish', and Mr Msiza, a 'little fish'. The commissioner was, accordingly, on point in treating Ms Mngunis evidence with caution.
JR958/16
JDG Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Supply Chain Services v Myhill NO and Others (JR958/16) [2018] ZALCJHB 287; (2018) 39 ILJ 2550 (LC) (11 September 2018)
[17] An employer can act inconsistently by not enforcing a rule at a prior point in time, only to enforce it thereafter, without warning, in respect of the same employee. In that context, the inconsistency is based on the impression which is created that the rule or standard in no longer applicable; is not regarded as serious by the employer, that disciplinary action will not necessarily be taken for non-compliance with the rule or that the type of behaviour is condoned by the employer. If the rule is then suddenly enforced, resulting in dismissal, the inconsistent application of the rule by the employer will be a factor which must be considered in order to determine whether the dismissal was unfair...[21] He did not put this to his managers at the disciplinary hearing when he had the opportunity to do so but only presented evidence in this regard for the first time when the employers case was already closed. He also did not call any of his former managers to give evidence hereto during the arbitration proceedings...[22] ...This can never equate with a genuine bona fide belief that a policy is no longer applicable or not regarded as serious based on the inconsistent application of the policy by the employer.
Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC).
[10] The legal principles applicable to consistency in the exercise of discipline are set out in Item 7 (b) (iii) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal establishes as a guideline for testing the fairness of a dismissal for misconduct whether the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer. This is often referred to as the parity principle, a basic tenet of fairness that requires like cases to be treated alike. The courts have distinguished two forms of inconsistency historical and contemporaneous inconsistency. The former requires that an employer apply the penalty of dismissal consistently with the way in which the penalty has been applied to other employees in the past; the latter requires that the penalty be applied consistently as between two or more employees who commit the same misconduct. A claim of inconsistency (in either historical or contemporaneous terms) must satisfy a subjective element - an inconsistency challenge will fail where the employer did not know of the misconduct allegedly committed by the employee used as a comparator (see, for example, Gcwensha v CCMA & Others [2006] 3 BLLR 234 (LAC) at paras 37-38). The objective element of the test to be applied is a comparator in the form of a similarly circumstanced employee subjected to different treatment, usually in the form of a disciplinary penalty less severe than that imposed on the claimant. (See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2001] 7 BLLR 840 (LC), at para 3.) Similarity of circumstance is the inevitably most controversial component of this test. An inconsistency challenge will fail where the employer is able to differentiate between employees who have committed similar transgressions on the basis of inter alia differences in personal circumstances, the severity of the misconduct or on the basis of other material factors. (Own emphasis, references excluded)
National Union of Mineworkers, obo Botsane v Anglo Platinum Mine (Rustenburg Section) (JA2013/42) [2014] ZALAC 24 (15 May 2014) at para 25
The idea of inconsistency in employee discipline derives from the notion that it is unfair that like are not treated alike. The core of this factor in the application of employee discipline (it would be a misconception to call it a principle) is the rejection of capricious or arbitrary conduct by an employer.AndIt has application in two respects. Mainly, it is a recognition of the unfairness of the condemnation of one person for genuine misconduct when another indistinguishable case of misconduct by another person is condoned. The second application is the recognition of the unfairness that results when disparate sanctions are meted out for indistinguishable misconduct to different persons[5].
SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union andOothers v Irvin & Johnson Ltd [1999] 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC).
"In my view too great an emphasis is quite frequently sought to be placed on the 'principle' of disciplinary consistency, also called the 'parity principle.' Consistency is simply an element of disciplinary fairness. Every employee must be measured by the same standards. Discipline must not be capricious. It is really the perception of bias inherent in selective discipline which makes it unfair "(references not included).
Minister of Correctional Services v Mthembu NO and Others (JR953/04) [2006] ZALCJHB 30 (24 March 2006) at para 8.
The consideration of consistency or equality of treatment (the so-called parity principle) is an element of disciplinary fairness, and it is really the perception of bias inherent in selective discipline that makes it unfair. (See Early Bird Farms (Pty) Ltd v S Mlambo [1997] 5 BLLR 540 (LAC) at 545H-I; SA Commercial Catering And Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd [1999] 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC) at 2313D-E; Cape Town City Council v Masitho and Others [2000] 21 ILJ 1957 (LAC) at 1960F-1961F and National Union Metal Workers of SA v Henred Fruehauf Trailers [1994] ZASCA 153; 1995 (4) SA 456(A) at 463G-I.) When an employer has in the past, as a matter of practice, not dismissed employees or imposed a specific sanction for contravention of a specific disciplinary rule, unfairness flows from the employees state of mind, i.e. the employees concerned were unaware that they would be dismissed for the offence in question. (own emphasis) When two or more employees engaged in the same or similar conduct at more or less the same time but only one or some of them are disciplined, or where different penalties are imposed, unfairness flows from the principle that like cases should, in fairness, be treated alike.
JR2220/15
South African Municipal Workers Union and Another v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR2220/15) [2018] ZALCJHB 243 (10 July 2018)
SA Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others[(2016) 37 ILJ 655 (LAC)] (the Kruger case)
[28] In Kruger, the LAC reaffirmed the reasoning in Chatrooghoon. In upholding the decision of the Labour Court, the LAC stated:[28] Pillay J thereupon held that the arbitrator's decision that the dismissal of Mr Kruger, by means of a substituted sanction based on a non-existent authority to make such a substitution, was not unreasonable and dismissed the review application. The 'merits' of the allegations of misconduct did not affect that decision and Pillay J, correctly, did not deal with the arbitrator's treatment of that topic. In my view, that approach by Pillay J was correct because once the dismissal decision was up-ended on grounds of invalidity, there was no need to enquire further, and indeed no logical room or justification, to entertain an enquiry into that subject-matter. The arbitrator, who did so, was misled into undertaking such an enquiry, and ultimately regardless of the factual findings, they could have no impact on the ratio in the award; i.e the substituted sanction was invalid and for that reason the dismissal was unfair.[10]...[29] The LAC also considered the employers contention that the finding of unfairness in such instances should be confined only to the question of procedural fairness but that the substantive merits of whether a dismissal was warranted by the misconduct could still be entertained. After a long excursus, the court unequivocally held that the invalidity of a subsequent decision by an employer to dismiss an employee contrary to an earlier valid decision is fatal and disposes of the need for a separate enquiry into the substantive fairness of the dismissal based on the underlying merits:[42] Thus, in my view, it must follow that if the substitution of a sanction is invalid, as found in Chatrooghoon, that invalidity vitiates the act completely; ie it cannot be made. Invalidity is more than procedural unfairness, it denotes an unlawful act; ie one the law will not acknowledge. Accordingly, in my view Pillay J was correct to hold that an invalid substitution of a sanction was not merely an instance of procedural unfairness that might leave open a space for a parallel enquiry into the appropriateness of a remedy for such a 'procedural' mishap and, in turn, allow space to address the gravamen of the misconduct per se. Similarly, the contention that the judgment of Ndlovu JA, in Chatrooghoon, has application only to procedural unfairness cannot succeed because the force of those dicta by Ndlovu JA is that a substitution of a sanction without a lawful foundation is not merely unfair for want of a procedural authorisation, but is invalid.
County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2003) 24 ILJ 355 (LAC)
SA Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2003) 24 ILJ 355 (LAC) (the Chatrooghoon case)
[27] In Chatrooghoon, the LAC found that the employer had acted ultra vires the disciplinary code and collective agreement in substituting its own decision for that of the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry, who imposed a sanction of fifteen days suspension without pay and a final written warning. The arbitrator had also found that there was no basis for finding the trust relationship had broken down.[8] The LAC decided that the sanction of the chairperson was the final one and not a mere recommendation.[9] Although the judgement did not starkly delineate its analysis of procedural and substantive fairness, the logic of the judgement makes it clear that in the circumstances, SARS was bound by the decision of the enquiry chairperson who decided that dismissal was not appropriate and therefore the employer could not defend a subsequent decision to impose a sanction of dismissal.
[34] The code makes no provision for the chairperson of the appeal hearing to make a recommendation, but requires him or her to decide the appeal. Moreover, the code makes no provision for any person other than the chairperson of the appeal hearing to decide the appeal. As such, Xulu had no power to reject Matsheketshekes recommendations and substitute them with his own decision. This is unlike Chatrooghoons case, where SARS altered a chairpersons decision, not a recommendation. All Xulu could have done was insist that Matsheketsheke take the appeal decision himself. Nevertheless, the upshot of all of this is that no decision, as such, was made on Bhengus appeal. That means the last competent decision taken under the code was that of the enquiry chairperson
JA138/2017
Department of Health (North West Province) v Strydom and Others (JA138/2017) [2019] ZALAC 75; (2020) 41 ILJ 619 (LAC) (26 November 2019)
[12] Second, the remark that seniority alone is insufficient to justify a different sanction, if intended as a statement of principle, is misconceived. It might be in a proper case. Relevant context ultimately governs the assessment of any factors deemed pertinent. On the facts of this case, it was an inappropriate criticism to advance because it misrepresents the Arbitrators findings, which, as cited above, did not rely on seniority in vacuo.
PA10/2017
South African Police Service v Magwaxaza and Others (PA10/2017) [2019] ZALAC 66; [2020] 2 BLLR 151 (LAC); (2020) 41 ILJ 408 (LAC) (5 November 2019)
[43] In Mashigo v SAPS,[4] this Court referred with approval to what is stated in Woolworths v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others[5], namely, (quoting Le Roux and Van Niekerk[6]): The principle in such cases is that provided a workplace standard has been contravened, which the employee knew (or reasonably should have known) could form the basis for discipline, and no significant prejudice flowed from the incorrect characterisation, an appropriate disciplinary sanction may be imposed. It will be enough if the employee is informed that the disciplinary enquiry arose out of the fact that on a certain date, time and place he is alleged to have acted wrongfully or in breach of the applicable rules or standards.[7]
the sanction of dismissal was appropriate and fair.
JA4/18
EOH Abantu (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JA4/18) [2019] ZALAC 57; (2019) 40 ILJ 2477 (LAC); [2019] 12 BLLR 1304 (LAC) (15 August 2019)
[15] One of the key elements of fairness is that an employee must be made aware of the charges against him. It is always best for the charges to be precisely formulated and given to the employee in advance of the hearing in order to afford a fair opportunity for preparation. The charges must be specific enough for the employee to be able to answer them. The employer ordinarily cannot change the charge, or add new charges, after the commencement of the hearing where it would be prejudicial to do so.[Transport and General Workers Union and another v Interstate Bus Lines (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 877 (IC).] However, by the same token, courts and arbitrators must not adopt too formalistic or technical an approach. It normally will be sufficient if the employee has adequate notice and information to ascertain what act of misconduct he is alleged to have committed. The categorisation by the employer of the alleged misconduct is of less importance.[Durban Confectionary Works t/a Beacon Sweets v Majangaza (1993) 14 ILJ 663 (LAC); and National Commissioner, SAPS v Myers [2012] 7 BLLR 688 (LAC) at para 97.]
[16]...The principle in such cases is that provided a workplace standard has been contravened, which the employee knew (or reasonably should have known) could form the basis for discipline, and no significant prejudice flowed from the incorrect characterisation, an appropriate disciplinary sanction may be imposed.[4] It will be enough if the employee is informed that the disciplinary enquiry arose out of the fact that on a certain date, time and place he is alleged to have acted wrongfully or in breach of applicable rules or standards.
[17] In short, there is no requirement that competent verdicts on disciplinary charges should be mentioned in the charge sheet - subject though to the general principle that the employee should not be prejudiced. Prejudice normally will only arise where the employee has been denied knowledge of the case he had to meet. Prejudice is absent if the record shows that had the employee been alerted to the possibility of a competent verdict on a disciplinary charge he would not have conducted his defence any differently or would not have had any other defence.[5]
JR751/2015
Ratlou Local Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) (JR751/2015) [2018] ZALCJHB 210 (20 June 2018)
Fidelity Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others (2008) 29 ILJ 964 (LAC).
It is an elementary principle of not only our labour law in this country but also of labour law in many other countries that the fairness orotherwise of the dismissal of an employee must be determined on the basis of the reasons for dismissal which the employer gave at the time of the dismissal.
JR806/13, J2033/14
G4S Cash Services SA (Pty) Ltd v NBCRFLI and Others (JR806/13, J2033/14) [2018] ZALCJHB 192 (1 June 2018)
employer bore the onus to show that the dismissal was fair. She accepted the employees consistent evidence that it was not his duty to handle receipts and that they were kept in the box room.
J1812/2016
Huma v Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and Another (J1812/2016) [2018] ZALCJHB 159; [2018] 8 BLLR 797 (LC) ; (2018) 39 ILJ 1753 (LC) (24 April 2018)
a tacit waiver of her right to an internal appeal.
requirements for waiver
Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC).
[81] The conclusion reached in para [79] above is in accordance with common-law principles regarding waiver of rights. Waiver is first and foremost a matter of intention; the test to determine intention to waive is objective, the alleged intention being judged by its outward manifestations adjudicated from the perspective of the other party, as a reasonable person. Our courts take cognisance of the fact that persons do not as a rule lightly abandon their rights. Waiver is not presumed; it must be alleged and proved; not only must the acts allegedly constituting the waiver be shown to have occurred, but it must also appear clearly and unequivocally from those facts or otherwise that there was an intention to waive. The onus is strictly on the party asserting waiver; it must be shown that the other party with full knowledge of the right decided to abandon it, whether expressly or by conduct plainly inconsistent with the intention to enforce it. Waiver is a question of fact and is difficult to establish.
the contract in question contains a non-waiver clause (I fno non-waiver clause the applies: whether a contracting party's delay in exercising its right to cancel (or resile from) a contract amounts to a waiver of that right depends on the reasonableness of the delay in the circumstances (Paradyskloof Golf Estate (Pty) Ltd v Stellenbosch Municipality 2011 (2) SA 525 (SCA). )
[20] The waiver defence must fail for this reason..
The conduct of the applicant in the Courts view cannot be considered as falling within the doctrine of peremption
South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (2017) 38 ILJ 97 (CC); 2017 (1) SA 549 (CC) (2017 (2) BCLR 241 at para 26.
The rule with regard to peremption is well settled, and has been enunciated on several occasions by this court. If the conduct of an unsuccessful litigant is such as to point indubitably and necessarily to the conclusion that he does not intend to attack the judgment, then he is held to have acquiesced in it. But the conduct relied upon must be unequivocal and must be inconsistent with any intention to appeal. And the onus of establishing that position is upon the party alleging it.
JR1091/2011
Xstrata South Africa (Proprietary) Limited - Thorncliffe Mine v NUM obo Mphofelo and Others (JR1091/2011) [2018] ZALCJHB 148 (11 April 2018)
(The ommissioner) found the respondents not guilty as charged because evidence that was led on behalf of the applicant did not support the charge.
The fact that the respondents were dismissed for misconduct different from the one with which they were charged is of no moment because the nature of the misconduct they were accused of was made clear at their disciplinary enquiries. They were therefore not prejudiced by the difference because they were aware that they were committing misconduct which was punishable by dismissal when they accessed the information and conveyed it to Dreyer. They were afforded an opportunity to state their cases before the decision to dismiss them was taken.
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA [2011] 10 BLLR 963 (LAC) para 32
[32]Unlike in criminal proceedings where it is said that the description of any statutory offence in the words of the law creating the offence, or in similar words, shall be sufficient, the misconduct charge on and for which the employee was arraigned and convicted at the disciplinary enquiry did not necessarily have to be strictly framed in accordance with the wording of the relevant acts of misconduct as listed in the appellants disciplinary codes, referred to above. It was sufficient that the wording of the misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet conformed, with sufficient clarity so as to be understood by the employee, to the substance and import of any one or more of the listed offences. After all, it is to be borne in mind that misconduct charges in the workplace are generally drafted by people who are not legally qualified and trained.
CA15/2017
National Commissioner of South African Police Service and Another v Mphalele N.O. and Another (CA15/2017) [2018] ZALAC 42 (11 December 2018)
appeal authority reversing sanction of dismissal against employee court finding that appeal authoritys decision irrational and unreasonable in light of the employees conduct.
21] In the premises, dismissal was the only sensible and rational operational response in the circumstances. Both the appeal authority and the Labour Court erred in this respect. There was no rational connection between the purpose of the SAPS Discipline Regulations pertaining to dishonesty, the evidence before the appeal authority and the reasons given by it for reducing the sanction. The decision was accordingly irrational and must be set aside on review for that reason alone.
[17] In their founding affidavit, the appellants submitted that the appeal authority unreasonably and irrationally failed to take proper account of the evidence regarding the breakdown of the employment relationship.
JA59/2017
Malapalane v Glencore Operations South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Goedevonden Colliery) and Others (JA59/2017) [2018] ZALAC 22; (2018) 39 ILJ 2467 (LAC) (15 August 2018)
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC) at para 32; First National BankA division of First Bank Ltd v Language and Others (2013) 34 ILJ 3103 (LAC) at 3108 para 23.
the formulation of disciplinary charges; that they need not be strictly framed in accordance with the wording of the relevant acts of misconduct as listed in the employers disciplinary codes. It was sufficient that the misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet was set out with sufficient clarity so as to be understood by the employee.
J190/15, JR2361/16
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa v Moreki and Others (J190/15, JR2361/16) [2017] ZALCJHB 114 (28 March 2017)
procedure in question on item 4 of Schedule 8 of the LRA
The following are the compulsory requirements as a minimum standard for a fair procedure:27.1 That an investigation should be conducted to establish whether there are grounds for dismissal and that investigation does not need to be a formal enquiry. A formal enquiry is in this context a reference to an oral hearing set-up.27.2 The employer must notify the employee of the allegations and be sure that the employee understands such allegations;27.3 The employer should allow the employee an opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations;27.4 The employer should allow the employee a reasonable time to prepare the response and to the assistance of a trade union representative or a fellow employee; and27.5 Finally, after the enquiry the employer should communicate its decision to the employee preferably in writing.
"exceptional circumstances" would be the case, where for instance, the employer does not afford the employee an audi or pre-dismissal process because witnesses are afraid to testify, or where it is impossible to serve the disciplinary notice on the employee. In that case, the employer cannot reasonably be expected to comply with the guidelines in sub-item (1) and, upon showing exceptional circumstances, it is permitted to dispense with the procedures that must normally precede a dismissal.
Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA [2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC) at 838
When the Code refers to an opportunity that must be given by the employer to the employee to state a case in response to any allegations made against that employee, which need not be a formal enquiry, it means no more than that there should be dialogue and an opportunity for reflection before any decision is taken to dismiss. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the substantive content of this process as defined by item 4 of the Code requires the conducting of an investigation, notification to the employee of any allegations that may flow from that investigation, and an opportunity, within a reasonable time, to prepare a response to the employers allegations with the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee....the question whether or not there has been such proper ventilation of issues can only be answered in the light of the representations made by or on behalf of the employee. It follows that where the employee has failed to make representations as to the charges or allegations in issue, as in the present case, the question of procedural fairness does not arise in that regard. The employee cannot complain that she was not afforded the audi when she did not state by way of written representations as to which aspects she deserves an oral hearing."
The propriety or otherwise of the procedure followed should be assessed, not on the basis of an earlier election or the existence or absence of exceptional circumstances but rather on whether or not the chosen process resulted in a proper ventilation of the issues raised and consequently in procedural fairness.
Solidarity v South African Broadcasting Corporation[2016] ZALCJHB 273 at para [49]
"...The most plausible interpretation of the provision is that, an employee is entitled to a disciplinary procedure that conforms both with the SABC code and procedures and with schedule 8.
[33] ...It is the respondent who elected not to make written representations as requested despite the clear warning of the consequences thereof. The applicant was left with little choice but to consider what was placed before it through the investigation report without the benefit of the respondents written representations as requested. The process followed may have been unfortunate but I do not see any basis for finding such process to have been unfair as contemplated in the LRA.
JR1693/16
Breed v Laser Cleaning Africa and Others (JR1693/16) [2017] ZALCJHB 102 (24 March 2017)
idelity Cash Management Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others(2008) 29ILJ964 (LAC)
[40] . The reason why, generally speaking, an employee is not obliged to attend his disciplinary hearing is that a disciplinary hearing is there to comply with the audi alteram partem rule before the employer may take a decision that may affect the employee or his rights or interests adversely. An employee can make use of that right if he so chooses but he can also decide not to exercise it. However, if he decides not to exercise that right after he has been afforded an opportunity to exercise it and a decision is subsequently taken by the employer that affects him in an adverse manner, he cannot be heard to complain that he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard.[41]. The fear that the employer may take an adverse decision against the employee without the employee stating his side of the story is the reason why employees normally attend their disciplinary hearings. All an employer can do, if an employee fails to attend his disciplinary enquiry, is to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry in the employee's absence and make such decision as he considers to be right in the light of all the evidence before him.
DA08/16
Workforce Group v McLintock and Others (DA08/16) [2017] ZALAC 49; (2017) 38 ILJ 2517 (LAC) (1 August 2017)
Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu & others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at 618 para 42 (see also Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union & others v Metrofile (Pty) Ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 231 (LAC))
(T)he element of consistency on the part of an employer in its treatment of employees is an important factor to take into account in the determination process of the fairness of a dismissal. However, as I say, it is only a factor to take into account in that process. It is by no means decisive of the outcome on the determination of reasonableness and fairness of the decision to dismiss. In my view, the fact that another employee committed a similar transgression in the past and was not dismissed cannot, and should not, be taken to grant a licence to every other employee, willy-nilly, to commit serious misdemeanours, especially of a dishonest nature, towards their employer in the belief that they will not be dismissed. It is well accepted in civilised society that two wrongs can never make a right. The parity principle was never intended to promote or encourage anarchy in the workplace. As stated earlier, I reiterate, there are varying degrees of dishonesty and, therefore, each case will be treated on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.
JA13/2016
Moodley v Department of National Treasury and Others (JA13/2016) [2017] ZALAC 5; [2017] 4 BLLR 337 (LAC); (2017) 38 ILJ 1098 (LAC) (10 January 2017)
21] The court a quo granted leave to appeal to this Court, inter alia, after having had regard, at that stage, to the most recent judgment of this Court on the issue of whether an employer could substitute the final sanction of a Chairperson of a disciplinary enquiry.
South African Revenue Service v CCMA and Others 2016] 3 BLLR 297 (LAC); (2016) 37 ILJ 655 (LAC).
The established law about an employer being disallowed from interfering in the outcome of a disciplinary enquiry where the Chair has the power to make a final decision, which is the crucial issue in this appeal has as its aim the protection of workers from arbitrary interference with discipline in a fair system of labour relations. The principle is worthy of preservation.
After concluding that Mr Krugers dismissal was unfair, the arbitrator immediately ordered his reinstatement without taking into account the provisions of section 193(2). She was supposed to consider specifically the provisions of section 193(2) to determine whether this was perhaps a case where reinstatement is precluded. She was also obliged to give reasons for ordering SARS to reinstate Mr Kruger despite its contention and evidence that his continued employment would be intolerable. She was required to say whether she considered Mr Krugers continued employment to be tolerable and if so, on what basis. This was not done. She does not even seem to have considered whether the seriousness of the misconduct and its potential impact in the workplace, were not such as to render reinstatement inappropriate and those are the key-factors she ought to have considered before she ordered SARS to reinstate Mr Kruger.
JA73/15
Bidserv Industrial Products ( Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JA73/15) [2017] ZALAC 4; (2017) 38 ILJ 860 (LAC) (10 January 2017)
Held, that the commissioner ought not to have embarked on the question of inconsistency in the application of discipline without having first determined the underlying reason for the dismissal and that he did not provide any basis for his finding that the other two employees of the appellant had been dishonest;
JR342/ 11
LA CRUSHERS vs CCMA
National Battery (Pty) Ltd v Matshoba and Others (2010) 5 BLLR 534 (LC)
the court pointed out that the labels assigned to the misconduct are irrelevant the point is whether the evidence demonstrates a case of wrongdoing.
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC)
[32] Unlike in criminal proceedings where it is said that 'the description of any statutory offence in the words of the law creating the offence, or in similar words, shall be sufficient', the misconduct charge on and for which the employee was arraigned and convicted at the disciplinary enquiry did not necessarily have to be strictly framed in accordance with the wording of the relevant acts of misconduct as listed in the appellant's disciplinary codes, referred to above. It was sufficient that the wording of the misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet conformed, with sufficient clarity so as to be understood by the employee, to the substance and import of any one or more of the listed offences. After all, it is to be borne in mind that misconduct charges in the workplace are generally drafted by people who are not legally qualified and trained. In this regard I refer to the work of Le Roux & Van Niekerk where the learned authors offer a suitable example, with which I agree:'Employers embarking on disciplinary proceedings occasionally define the alleged misconduct incorrectly. For example, an employee is charged with theft and the evidence either at the disciplinary enquiry or during the industrial court proceedings, establishes unauthorised possession of company property. Here the rule appears to be that, provided a disciplinary rule has been contravened, that the employee knew that such conduct could be the subject of disciplinary proceedings, and that he was not significantly prejudiced by the incorrect characterization, discipline appropriate to the offence found to have been committed may be imposed.'
JR809/15
NTM obo Dikgale v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR809/15) [2017] ZALCJHB 473 (18 December 2017)
Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council and others (2011) 32 ILJ 1766 (LC)
An employee on a final written warning for the same offence will normally be regarded as irredeemable, and dismissal will be justified if the employee commits a similar offence during the currency of the warning Usually, the presence of a valid final written warning at the time of the commission of the same or similar form of misconduct should be properly interpreted as aggravating in nature. The principles of progressive discipline require such a re-offending employee usually to be considered irredeemable I accept that the purpose of the warning is to impress upon the employee the seriousness of his actions as well as the possible future consequences which might ensure if he misbehaves again[2]
JS867/2006
Public Servants Association of South Africa obo Motapanyane v Premier: Free State Province and Another (JS867/2006) [2017] ZALCJHB 467 (1 December 2017)
SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others v Irvin and Johnson Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 23-2 (LAC).
In my view too great an emphasis is quite frequently sought to be placed on the 'principle' of disciplinary consistency, also called the 'parity principle' (as to which see eg Grogan Workplace Law (4 ed) at 145 and Le Roux & Van Niekerk The SA Law of Unfair Dismissal at 110). There is really no separate 'principle' involved. Consistency is simply an element of disciplinary fairness (M S M Brassey 'The Dismissal of Strikers' (1990) 11 ILJ 213 at 229). Every employee must be measured by the same standards (Reckitt & Colman (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & others(1991) 12 ILJ 806 (LAC) at 813H-I). Discipline must not be capricious.
Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC).
However, it ought to be realised, in my view, that the parity principle may not just be applied willy-nilly without any measure of caution. In this regard, I am inclined to agree with Professor Grogan when he remarks as follows:'[T]he parity principle should be applied with caution. It may well be that employees who thoroughly deserved to be dismissed profit from the fact that other employees happened not to have been dismissed for a similar offence in the past or because another employee involved in the same misconduct was not dismissed through some oversight by a disciplinary officer, or because different disciplinary officers had different views on the appropriate penalty.'
Bidserv Industrial Products (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others (2017) 38 ILJ 860 (LAC)
This court sounded a warning on approaching the question of inconsistency in the application of discipline willy-nilly without any measure of caution. Inconsistency is a factor to be taken into account in the determination of the fairness of the dismissal but by no means decisive of the outcome on the determination of reasonableness and fairness of the decision to dismiss. A generalised allegation of inconsistency is not sufficient. A concrete allegation identifying who the persons are who were treated differently and the basis upon which they ought not to have been treated differently or that no distinction should have been made must be set out clearly.
J2747/17
Kolobe v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Health: North West Province and Another (J2747/17) [2017] ZALCJHB 407 (9 November 2017)
[11] I am satisfied that this is a very clear case where the executive authority dismissed an employee without acting in terms of the above provisions, and accordingly acted ultra vires quite apart from whether he breached the employers contractual obligation to conduct an enquiry in compliance with the PSA. This is one of those exceptional circumstances where urgent final relief is appropriate. The fact that the applicant may have other remedies does not deprive him of the remedy to challenge action which is a clear breach of the principle of legality and an equally clear breach of his contractual entitlements. Under the circumstances, the applicants dismissal was unlawful and void ab initio.
G4S Cash Services SA (Pty) Ltd v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry and Others (JR1103/13) [2017] ZALCJHB 335 (6 September 2017)
[18] The Labour Appeal Court in Edcon without hesitation followed the Sidumo approach with approval[6]. It is highly notable that over the years the Courts exercised caution when dealing with cases where inconsistent application of discipline happened to be an issue. The inconsistency issue in this matter emerged out of repeated misconduct related to non-compliance with procedures which is usually characterized as comparing apples with apples. It is trite that a plea of inconsistency should to a large extent be sparingly upheld by arbitrators when raised. With or without invitation the arbitrator is required to apply a discretion that is upon consideration of all facts placed before him/her. The reason being that the raising of inconsistency cannot automatically come as a bar to imposition of dismissal.
Conmed Health CC v Bargaining Councilfor theChemical Industries and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 623 (LC)
As stated previously by this court the parity rule does not take away the right of the employer to impose different sanctions on employees who were involved in the same act of misconduct. The issue when faced with the complaint that the employer has applied discipline inconsistently is to consider the fairness of such inconsistent application of discipline. In other words, the differential sanctions do not automatically lead to the conclusion that the dismissal was unfair. The fairness of the dismissal has to be determined on the basis of whether the employer, in imposing differential sanctions, acted unfairly. In assessing the fairness of a dismissal in a case involving the imposition of differential sanctions, the commissioner has to consider whether there is an objective and fair reason for imposing different sanctions for misconduct arising from the same offence.
National Union of Mineworkers on behalf of Botsane v Anglo Platinum mine (Rustenburg section) (2014) 35 ILJ 2406 (LAC)
Moreover, as a matter of practice, a party, usually the aggrieved employee, who believes that a case for inconsistency can be argued, ought, at the outset of proceedings, to aver such an issue openly and unequivocally so that the employer is put on proper and fair terms to address it. A generalised allegation is never good enough. A concrete allegation identifying who the persons are who were treated differently and the basis upon which they ought not to have been treated differently must be set out clearly. Introducing such an issue in an ambushlike fashion, or as an afterthought, does not serve to produce a fair adjudication process. (See: SACCAWU and Others v Irvin and Johnson Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC) at [29]; also see: Masubelele v Public Health and Social Development Bargaining Council and Others [2013] ZALCJHB JR 2008/1151] which contains an extensive survey of the case law about the idea of inconsistency in employee discipline).
SA Police Services v Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 715 (LC)
Once the employee has pertinently put the issue of consistent treatment in issue, the employer has a duty to rebut such allegations. In the context of a case in which evidence was led by the employee of inconsistent treatment, Landman J held in Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd t/a Adamas Mill v Lallie and others (1999) 20 ILJ 645 (LC ) at 647 para 5:'As regards the onus, the onus of proving that the dismissal was fair, and thus of rebutting the allegation of inconsistency, is one which rests squarely on the employer.
Commissioners may find sanction harsher than the one prescribed in the disciplinary code appropriate when there is evidence justifying deviation from the prescribed sanction. Absent evidence, the commissioners decision that the harsher sanction is appropriate is unreasonable and defective
the following considerations apply to the determination of the issue of inconsistency: (1) Employees must be measured against the same standards (like for like comparison); (2) Did the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry conscientiously and honestly determine the misconduct; (3) The decision by the employer not to dismiss other employees involved in the same misconduct must not be capricious, or induced by improper motives or by a discriminating management policy (in other words this conduct must be bona fide)[55]; and (4) A value judgment must always be exercised[56].
Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 452 (LC)
An inconsistency challenge will fail where the employer is able to differentiate between employees who have committed similar transgressions on the basis of inter alia differences in personal circumstances, the severity of the misconduct or on the basis of other material factors
Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2642 (SCA) at para 19.
It is to Naidoo's testimony, as Edcon's sole witness in the arbitration, as well as the documentary evidence referred to above, that one must look to see if indeed there was evidence showing that Reddy's conduct had destroyed the trust relationship between her and Edcon. Naidoo's testimony in the arbitration was mainly to recount the investigative history of the matter. He also testified that Edcon was intolerant towards dishonesty and that employees were generally dismissed if they committed dishonest acts. This, he said, was one of Edcon's core values. As already mentioned Naidoo was the investigator of Reddy's misconduct and fielded some of her lies. It was at his recommendation, as investigator, that Reddy was suspended and eventually disciplined. What becomes immediately apparent is that Naidoo's evidence did not, and could not, deal with the impact of Reddy's conduct on the trust relationship. Neither did Naidoo testify that Reddy's conduct had destroyed the trust relationship. This was the domain of those managers to whom Reddy reported. They are the persons who could shed light on the issue. None testified.... The gravamen of Edcon's case against Reddy was that her conduct breached the trust relationship. Someone in management and who had dealings with Reddy in the employment setup, as already alluded to, was required to tell Pillemer in what respects Reddy's conduct breached the trust relationship. All we know is that Reddy was employed as a quality control auditor; no evidence was adduced to identify the nature and scope of her duties, her place in the hierarchy, the importance of trust in the position that she held or in the performance of her work, or the adverse effects, either direct or indirect, on Edcon's operations because of her retention, eg because of precedent or example to others.
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Mabija and Others (2016) 37 ILJ 1380 (LAC) at para 21.
Even if the relationship of trust is breached, it would be but one of the factors that should be weighed with others in order to determine whether the sanction of dismissal was fair.
Absa Bank Ltd v Naidu and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 602 (LAC) at para 46.
Obviously, the fact of a guilty plea per se or mere verbal expression of remorse is not necessarily a demonstration of genuine contrition. It could be nothing more than shedding crocodile tears. Therefore, the crucial question is whether it could be said that Ms Naidu's utterances empirically and objectively translated into real and genuine remorse. In S v Matyityi, the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked as follows on this issue:'There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one's error. Whether the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of those actions.
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at para 25.
Acknowledgment of wrong doing is the first step towards rehabilitation. In the absence of a re-commitment to the employer's workplace values, an employee cannot hope to re-establish the trust which he himself has broken.
De Beers
'A dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much less is it an act of vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operational response to risk management in the particular enterprise.
JR755/14
PSA OBO Rae v General Public Services Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (JR755/14) [2017] ZALCJHB 410 (6 April 2017)
Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd (2010) 31 ILJ 1844 (LAC) at 1850A-C.
Progressive sanctions were designed to bring the employee back into the fold, so as to ensure, by virtue of the particular sanction, that faced with the same situation again, an employee would resist the commission of the wrongdoing upon which act the sanction was imposed. The idea of a progressive sanction is to ensure that an employee can be reintegrated into the embrace of the employer's organization, in circumstances where the employment relationship can be restored to that which pertained prior to the misconduct.
Gcwensha v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 927 (LAC) at para 32. See also Transnet Freight Rail (supra) at para 43.
I accept that the purpose of a warning is to impress upon the employee the seriousness of his actions as well as the possible future consequences which might ensue if he misbehaves again, namely that arepetition of misconduct could lead to his dismissal.
JR220/13
Mathebula v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others (JR220/13) [2017] ZALCJHB 12 (19 January 2017)
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC) At 2467-8.
[32] Unlike in criminal proceedings where it is said that 'the description of any statutory offence in the words of the law creating the offence, or in similar words, shall be sufficient',the misconduct charge on and for which the employee was arraigned and convicted at the disciplinary enquiry did not necessarily have to be strictly framed in accordance with the wording of the relevant acts of misconduct as listed in the appellant's disciplinary codes, referred to above. It was sufficient that the wording of the misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet conformed, with sufficient clarity so as to be understood by the employee, to the substance and import of any one or more of the listed offences. After all, it is to be borne in mind that misconduct charges in the workplace are generally drafted by people who are not legally qualified and trained. In this regard I refer to the work of Le Roux & Van Niekerk where the learned authors offer a suitable example, with which I agree:'Employers embarking on disciplinary proceedings occasionally define the alleged misconduct incorrectly. For example, an employee is charged with theft and the evidence either at the disciplinary enquiry or during the industrial court proceedings, establishes unauthorised possession of company property. Here the rule appears to be that, provided a disciplinary rule has been contravened, that the employee knew that such conduct could be the subject of disciplinary proceedings, and that he was not significantly prejudiced by the incorrect characterization, discipline appropriate to the A offence found to have been committed may be imposed.'[33] To my mind, the misconduct charge against the employee was framed in such a manner as to have sufficiently embraced most of the specific acts of misconduct listed in the appellant's 'Honesty Code of Conduct' and the 'Disciplinary Code: Policy Amended 15/5/2000',which I have referred to above
what should be contained in a charge sheet.
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others([2011] 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC)
[32] Unlike in criminal proceedings were it is said that the description of any statutory offence in the words of the law creating the offence, all in similar words, shall be sufficient, the misconduct charge on and for which the employee was arraigned and convicted at the disciplinary enquiry did not necessarily have to be strictly framed in accordance with the wording of the relevant acts of misconduct as listed in the appellants disciplinary codes, referred to above. It was sufficient that the wording of the misconduct alleged in the charge sheet conformed, with sufficient clarity so as to be understood by the employee, to the substance and import of anyone of or more of the listed offences. After all, it is to be borne in mind that misconduct charges in the workplace are generally drafted by people who are not legally qualified and trained. In this regard I refer to the work of Le Roux and Van Niekerk where the learned authors offer a suitable example, with which I agree:Employers embarking on disciplinary proceedings occasionally define the alleged misconduct incorrectly. For example, an employee is charged with theft and the evidence either at the disciplinary enquiry or during the Industrial Court proceedings, establishes unauthorised possession of company property. Here the rule appears to be that, provided a disciplinary rule has been contravened, that the employee knew that such conduct could be the subject of disciplinary proceedings, and that he was not significantly prejudiced by the incorrect characterisation, discipline appropriate to the offence found to have been committed may be enclosed.
JR438/13
Bader SA (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Meditation and Arbitration and Others (JR438/13) [2016] ZALCJHB 550 (20 December 2016)
(SACCAWU & Others v Erwin & Johnson Limited[1999] 20 ILJ 2302 (LAC)
There is no suggestion that the Applicant acted in bad faith. It is trite in our law that historical inconsistency will not assist an employee who is aware of the rule concerned
J2767/16
Khena v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (J2767/16) [2016] ZALCJHB 457 (6 December 2016)
[46]In my view the Applicant has satisfied the requirements and has shown a clear right to be entitled to specific performance insofar as he seeks an order to set aside the termination of his employment and reinstatement until there has been compliance with the Respondents disciplinary code and procedure.
JR2826/11
Central University of technology v Kholoane and Others (JR2826/11) [2016] ZALCJHB 356; (2017) 38 ILJ 167 (LC) (23 September 2016)
Final warning amended with dismissal
32It is on this basis that I hold a view that, Clauses in disciplinary procedures and or codes that allow for senior management to make changes to sanctions cannot be understood to give unfettered discretion to management but must be understood to be tools to correct sanctions in circumstances where the sanctions of the chairpersons are wholly or shockingly inappropriate. It is unlikely that a sanction that is listed as an alternative could be viewed as such. In the premises there was no basis in fact and in law for the changes to the sanction herein.
JR2299/14
South African Municipal Workers' Union obo Cindi and Another v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (JR2299/14) [2016] ZALCJHB 342; (2017) 38 ILJ 472 (LC) (30 August 2016)
The dismissal of the Applicants members was not and could not have been suspended by their noting of an appeal against their dismissal. Lugebu v Walter Sisulu University (1589/2013) [2015] ZAECMHC 3 (29 January 2015) at para 9.
Nchabeleng v University of Venda and Others (2003) 24 ILJ 585 (LC).
[22] An ingenuous contention advanced by the applicant is that the dismissal visited on him on 28 May 2002 is automatically suspended because he noted an appeal against it. In this regard he relies on the common-law rule that the noting of an appeal suspends an order of court. That such is the law in respect of the orders of courts of law is clear from, inter alia, the judgment of Roux J in United Reflective Converters (Pty) Ltd v Levine 1988 (4) SA 460 (W) at 463F. What the applicant's contention does not give due recognition to, is that this principle applies to orders of court and does not, without more, apply to the decisions of other decision-makers in society. Indeed, this is illustrated in Leburu v Voorsitter, Nasionale Vervoerkommissie 1983 (4) SA 89 (W). In that decision Groskopff J considered whether or not an appeal against a decision of a local road transportation board automatically suspended the decision of that board. He held that it did not, the provisions of the governing statute being a clear indication that the common law of automatic suspension would not apply.[23] In my view it is wholly misconceived to attempt to import the doctrine of the automatic suspension of an order of a court upon the noting of an appeal, into the industrial relations environment. It should not be forgotten that a valid lawful dismissal does not incorporate as a matter of law any right to an appeal. A 'right' to appeal flows solely from the practice, endorsed in the LRA Code of Good Conduct: Dismissals, as a ready means by which a procedurally fair dismissal, give the equitable norms promoted under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, may be proven. The provision of an appeal is confined to the arena of unfairness.[24] In my view, the notion of the noting of an appeal suspending the effect of an order has no place whatsoever in the law of unfair dismissal.
Booysen v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (JA2013/13) [2014] ZALCJHB 161 (13 May 2014) at para 19.
When an employee is lawfully, albeit unfairly dismissed, the employment relationship is terminated there and then. (It is true that for the purpose of proceedings in the Labour law realm the necessary fiction is upheld that the relationship continues but that is a legal construct which exists to facilitate equity litigation and does not undermine the finality of the dismissal per se.) Unlike in legal proceedings where an appeal suspends the operation of a judgment, no such doctrine of suspended operation is applicable to a dismissal by an employer.
J47/12
Mogalakwena Local Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (J47/12) [2016] ZALCJHB 315 (4 June 2016)
The section does not suggest that the procedural fairness of a dismissal must also be measured mechanically against the procedural stipulations of a particular disciplinary code. No doubt, if an employer denies an employee their right to use the more extensive procedural provisions of an agreed disciplinary code so that the employees ability to conduct their defence to the charges is prejudiced, a finding of procedural unfairness might still be appropriate, even though the provisions breached set a higher standard than the LRA requires. However, it is not sufficient that merely because a provision in an agreed procedure is not complied with, that such non-compliance can be equated with procedural unfairnessper se. In this instance, the arbitrator appeared to have adopted the stance that non-compliance with the disciplinary code and procedure automatically required a finding of procedural unfairness.
AvrilElizabeth Home for The Mentally Handicapped v Commission For Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC)
This is not to say that employers and unions cannot agree to retain the criminal justice model if they are so inclined, whether by way of a collective agreement (as was the case in MEC: Dept of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani(2004) 25 ILJ 2311 (SCA);[2005] 2 BLLR 173(SCA)) or by G way of a contract of employment or employment policies and practices. In this instance, employers are obviously bound to apply the standards to which they have agreed or that they have established.
JA10/2016
MacDonald's Transport Upington (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and Others (JA10/2016) [2016] ZALAC 32; (2016) 37 (ILJ) 2593 (LAC); [2017] 2 BLLR 105 (LAC) (28 June 2016)
Right of dismissed employees to choose a union to represent them in unfair dismissal arbitration employer contending that union could not represent employees as they are not union members in good standing, their membership having lapsed for non-payment of subscription fees interpretation of unions constitution constitution, properly interpreted not subjecting membership to a condition that fees be actually paid employees becoming union members in terms of its constitution upon submitting application form and acceptance thereof employees were members at all relevant times
Employees right to choose a representative in unfair dismissal proceedings distinguished from unions demand for organisational rights - in dismissal proceedings before the CCMA or a Bargaining Council forum, the union is not usually the party, the employees are the parties rule 25 of CCMA Rules. Employees having the right to choose a union as their representative in dismissal proceedings - when a union demands to represent a member in dismissal proceedings it usually asserts its members rights not its own. Union also entitled to represent members in dismissal proceedings section 200 of LRA
JR86/2011, JA8/2015
Dorrainn Bailiff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR86/2011, JA8/2015) [2016] ZALAC 20 (26 May 2016)
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and Others 2001 (4) SA 1038 (LAC)
An employer and an employee may deal with these matters in their contract of employment. . These matters may also be governed by an established practice in a particular workplace. Depending on what the contract of employment between the parties, or, the applicable collective agreement, provides or what the established practice is in a particular workplace, the fact that an employees previous warning has lapsed or expired may well mean in a particular workplace that such employee must be treated as having a clean record when he is next found guilty of misconduct.
J2239/2015
BEMAWU and Others v SABC and Others (J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 (2 March 2016)
Booysens v Minister of Safety and Security2011 (32)ILJ112 (LAC) at paragraph 54
The court will only intervene in incomplete disciplinary hearings in exceptional circumstances. The Court said that there is no exhaustive list of such circumstances but that:
JR2172/2011
Ledwaba v Mpahpulu N.O. and Others (JR2172/2011) [2015] ZALCJHB 377 (23 October 2015)
In dealing with the point in limine, one should not lose sight of the purpose of the charge-sheet, namely to ensure that the dismissed employee is made aware of the allegations he is to face in the disciplinary hearing. Disciplinary charges are not intended to be a precise statement of the elements of an offence. The charges need only be sufficiently precise to allow the charged employee to identify the incident which forms the subject-matter of the complaint in order for him or her to prepare a suitable defence.
Korsten v Macsteel (Pty) Ltd & another [1996] 8 BLLR 1015 (IC) at 1020; and Dywili v Brick & Clay [1995] 7 BLLR 42 (IC) at 47B-C.
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others. (2011) 32 ILJ 2455 (LAC) at 2467, para [32]
JR 2610/12
Sepang v Dibakwane and Others (JR 2610/12) [2015] ZALCJHB 235 (4 August 2015)
SATAWU & Others v Ikhwezi Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 2009) 30 ILJ 205 (LC)
employer is indeed entitled to impose different penalties on different employees who had committed the same misconduct, provided there was a fair and objective basis for doing so. Thus where inconsistency of application of discipline is claimed, it is for the employee to show in what material respects the employer had acted inconsistently, and it is not enough for the employee to simply make an allegation of inconsistency.
JA 06/11
South African Revenue Service v CCMA and Others
the decision by the commissioner of SARS to substitute a sanction of dismissal for the sanction of a suspension imposed by the disciplinary enquiry chair found to be invali
JR483/13
Metrorail (PRASA) v SATAWU obo Tshabalala and Others (JR483/13) [2015] ZALCJHB 422 (5 October 2015)
Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and Another 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA) at para 7
. If a person foresees the risk of harm but acts, or fails to act, in the unreasonable belief that he or she will be able to avoid the danger or that for some other reason it will not eventuate, the conduct in question may amount to ordinary negligence or it may amount to gross negligence (or recklessness in the wide sense) depending on the circumstances. . even in the absence of conscious risk-taking, conduct may depart so radically from the standard of the reasonable person as to amount to gross negligence . It follows that whether there is conscious risk-taking or not, it is necessary in each case to determine whether the deviation from what is reasonable is so marked as to justify it being condemned as gross . It follows, I think, that to qualify as gross negligence the conduct in question, although falling short of dolus eventualis, must involve a departure from the standard of the reasonable person to such an extent that it may properly be categorised as extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to be conscious risk-taking, a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no conscious risk-taking, a total failure to take care .
In Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza (1999) 20 ILJ 578 (LAC) at para 35
The probable explanation for his conduct, in these circumstances, is simply that he deliberately neglected to perform his duties. Consequently, I do not share the view of the Industrial Court that the evidence against Khoza was so circumstantial that it could not be used to explain his conduct. It was Khoza who had to furnish that explanation. In the absence of any credible explanation, the inference that he deliberately neglected to perform his duty is irresistible. This finding by the employer cannot be faulted.
To have hearing within a prescribed time stipulated in collective agreement and incorporated in employees conditions of service. Failure to hold disciplinary hearing within the stipulated period. Arbitrator entitled in terms of s 138(9) of the LRA to make an order declaring a disciplinary hearing held outside the stipulated period null and void.
Sanction of suspension, final. Whilst it was trite that the duty of trust and confidence on the part of an employee was a term implied by law in an employment contract, such implied term did not extend to include the right of an employer to substitute its own sanction for that of the chairperson, particularly in a situation such as the present where the parties in a collective agreement elected expressly to confer on the disciplinary chairperson the sole power to impose the final sanction.
Ultra vires and no audi et alteram partem
Disciplinary code requiring second notification of hearing on a date at least 24 hours later. Breach of this requirement.This procedural defect not cured by subsequent appeal hearing at which there was merely argument. Dismissal procedurally unfair.
Khoza v Gypsum Industries Ltd [1997] 7 BLLR 857 (LAC).
LC only intervene exceptional circumstances
Theft
No dismissal
Unreasonable
C641/09
National Commissioner of Police & Another v Senior Superintendent Harri NO & Another
Recusal of Chairperson
chairpersons refusal to recuse himself, the employee filed a High Court applic recusal.
Enquiry taking form of a meeting at which employee handed a letter setting out complaint and sanction
guilty of dishonesty as opposed to a breach of the applicants policies and procedures
Charge sheet
fell short in drafting charge sheets in an attempt to categorize the misconduct, as long as the employee knew what the essence of the misconduct
Application for interdict
Premature; bypassed domestic proceedings
Failure to follow own rules
Local government
Chairperson may not make recommendation
Amend charges
opportunity to address
factual allegations not catagoration in charges
J1153/08
Munnik Basson Dagama Attorneys v CCMA & Others
Preliminary investigation audit
no audi alteram partem
Other case law sited
Highveld District Council v CCMA & Others (2002) 12 BLLR 1158 (LAC)
The mere fact that a procedure is an agreed one does not however make it fair. By the same token, the fact that an agreed procedure is not followed does not in itself mean that the procedure actually followed was unfairWhen deciding whether a particular procedure was fair, the tribunal judging the fairness must scrutinize the procedure actually followed. It must decide whether in all the circumstances the procedure was fair.
JR164/06
Dell v Seton (Pty) Ltd & Others
Appeal
was denied an appeal against the decision did not render the disciplinary procedure defective
employee leaving hearing after advocate was barred from hearing - court found employee not denied legal representation
Splitting of allegations not permitted
question if permission would have been granted irrelevant
relevant as no prima facie case exist
defect in hearing
Consider code; no provision for full rehearing
Res judicata
Disciplinary enquiry Whether employee entitled to raise res judicata on the basis of an earlier hearing and sanction imposed for same offence Fact of fresh hearing not per se irregular Employer having had fair reason for seeking further enquiry Matter eventually decided on different basis.
authority
Chairperson Local Government Power to appoint
Local Government
Chairperson must impose sanction not recommendation.
substitute decision, only if collective agreement admits
To make employee aware of allegations he is to face; need only be sufficiently precise to allow the employee to identify the incident;
such a right can be derived from the principles of fairness, provided the employee has been informed of the reasons for the suspension and is not deprived of his salary and other benefits while on suspension.
Black Mountain vs CCMA & Others [2005] 1 BLLR 1 (LC): where the employer's disciplinary code and policy provide for a particular approach it will generally be considered unfair to follow a different approach without legitimate justification. Justice requires that employers should be held to the standards they have adopted. I am in agreement with the proposition that disciplinary codes are guidelines and that an employer will not necessarily be regarded as having acted procedurally unfairly if it did not comply with certain specific parts of its code. I do not believe that the fact that there is clear case law to the effect that disciplinary codes are guidelines can under any circumstance be understood by employers as meaning that they may chop and change the disciplinary procedures they have themselves set as and when they wish. Employees (and employers) are entitled to expect that their employers (and employees) will comply with the prescribed rules of the game as far as disciplinary enquiries go (and for that matter, as far as all rules set in the workplace, for both employers and employees, are concerned). When an employer does not comply with aspects of its own disciplinary procedures, there must be good reason shown for its failure to comply with its own set of rules. An employer must justify the non-compliance with its own code and, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the employer bears the onus tosatisfy the objective requirement that their conduct was substantially fair, reasonable and equitable.
audi alteram partem rule
where the opportunity to be heard was given after a decision was made and then that opportunity rejected, it could be said that the audi alteram partem rule was complied with. Noted further that the opportunity to be heard before an independent party certainly satisfied the rule and was perhaps even fairer than the opportunity that should have been given before the decision. It was also noted that in Administrator, Tvl & Others v Traub & Others (1989 (4) SA 731 (A)) the Appellate Division had acknowledged that there were circumstances where it was acceptable for the audi alteram partem rule to be observed after the decision was taken.
disciplinary code had formed part of Mr Riekerts contract of employment and although a code is a guideline it was held that employers could not chop and change the code to suit themselves and employees had a right to expect the company to follow its own procedures. Held that an employer bore the onus of justifying its non-compliance with internal codes and showing such conduct to have been fair, reasonable and equitable
Procedurally unfaif
Notice not contain charges
that the failure to convene an enquiry promptly in a similar in casu is so grossly unfair that it vitiates the decision to dismiss.: Union of Pretoria Municipal Workers & Another v Stadsraad van Pretoria (1992 (1) IJ 1563)
Interdict
Jonker acted precipitately in launching this application before the inquiry was actually held. As a matter of law the employee should have shown actual prejudice arising from the procedure followed. Held that a procedural irregularity that does not result in prejudice is not actionable (Highveld District Council v CCMA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 517 (LAC) )
Rules
was held to be flawed because the steps laid down in the code were not followed. Counsel for Denel held that the procedure they followed was fair under the Bill of Rights. Held that this argument was specious as the proper procedure was equally fair and ought to have been followed to the letter
The true test is whether, seen objectively, there exists a reasonable apprehension that the Judge (or in this case the chairperson) may be biased, as viewed by a reasonable, objective and informed person
a chairperson has a discretion to allow legal representation and should consider in each case whether such representation is indispensable to ensuring a procedurally fair hearing. Noted that the failure to allow representation in certain circumstances could effectively be a denial of access to a court or tribunal in terms of s34 of the Constitution. Held further that whether there is a collective agreement regulating legal representation is a vital consideration in the exercise of this discretion.
employer argued that it was not aware of the full extent of the falsifications
that fairness applies to both the employer and the employee. It involves the balancing of competing and sometimes conflicting interests of the employer, on the one hand, and the employee on the other. The weight to be attached to those respective interests depends largely on the overall circumstances of each case. Noted that in casu the first warning had been given by the employer before a proper investigation of the facts had been undertaken. Held that it was unfair to the [employer] to have it denied the opportunity of having the facts evaluated
the arbitrator had misconducted himself in not revealing that he had performed work for the municipality in the past
Managers who chair enquiries are not neutral or oblivious to the employers interests. They are not judicial officers and they cannot reasonably be expected to exercise the same degree of judicial discipline and independence. Despite this, industrial relations practice permits managers to chair enquiries. Hence the law provides mediation and adjudication to correct any unfairness
